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One key element of decision making is predicting how different outcomes will make us 
feel. While individuals vary considerably in this ability, known as affective forecasting, the 
reasons for this variability in prediction accuracy are largely unknown. This dissertation aims to 
uncover why some people are better forecasters than others. We test the hypothesis that affective 
forecasting is supported by a fundamental psychological ability—i.e., affective working memory. 
Affective working memory refers to the distinct domain of working memory responsible for 
actively maintaining and working with feeling states. Because affective forecasting requires 
conjuring up and maintaining emotional experiences for evaluation, we predicted that individuals 
who are better able to maintain feeling states (i.e., superior affective working memory), would be 
more accurate in predicting their future feelings. Across Study 1 (Study 1a: N = 66; Study 1b: N 
= 68) and Study 2 (N = 96), results emerged in support of this hypothesis such that working 
memory for emotion uniquely predicted affective forecasting accuracy, whereas working 
memory for perceptual (i.e., brightness) information, did not. In Study 3 (N = 85), we more 
firmly establish the selective relationship between forecasting accuracy and affective working 
memory, finding that performance on two additional, widely used measures of visual working 
memory does not explain any variability in forecasting accuracy beyond the variability explained 
by affective working memory. In Study 4 (N =76), we find that this relationship between 
affective working memory and forecasting accuracy generalizes to a real-world event where we 
measured predicted and experienced feelings to the outcome of the 2020 United States 
presidential election. Thus, across the studies presented in this dissertation, we find consistent 
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evidence that individual differences in the ability to maintain emotional experiences predicts 
variability in forecasting accuracy. These findings advance our understanding of the mechanistic 
underpinnings of forecasting accuracy and demonstrate that affective working memory is a core 





A crucial aspect of making good decisions is predicting how different outcomes will 
make us feel. From deciding which job to take, which house to buy, or who to marry, the ability 
to predict our future feelings is fundamental to wellbeing. This ability, known as affective 
forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), varies greatly among individuals, yet the reasons for this 
variability are poorly understood. This dissertation aims to uncover why some people are better 
forecasters than others. While previous studies have proposed that forecasting accuracy may be 
explained by individual differences in trait-level abilities (i.e., emotional intelligence, personality 
traits), we hypothesize that affective forecasting relies specifically on affective working 
memory—a distinct domain of working memory responsible for actively maintaining and 
working with feeling states. Because affective forecasting requires conjuring up and maintaining 
emotional experiences for evaluation, we predicted that individuals who are better able to 
maintain feeling states (i.e., better affective working memory), would be more accurate in 
predicting their future feelings. In contrast, we predicted that the ability to maintain non-affective 
(i.e., cognitive) information would not account for variability in forecasting. Evidence in support 
of these hypotheses would lend credence to the idea that affective working memory is a unique, 
fundamental capacity that contributes to emotional prospective thought. Such evidence would 
also uncover a key component of affective forecasting—an ability that has yet to be decomposed 




We have known for centuries that feelings play a role in decision making (Bentham, 
1789; Jevons, 1879; Edgeworth, 1881). However, it wasn’t until more recently that researchers 
began to incorporate emotion into theoretical models of choice behavior. One of the primary 
ways that emotions influence our decisions is through affective forecasting, i.e., predicting our 
future feelings. According to Decision Affect Theory (DAT; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho & Ritov, 
1997), when making a decision, we consider the anticipated feelings for each outcome to 
ultimately guide us to our choice. This idea is supported by robust evidence that models of 
decision making that include expected feelings predict choice behavior above and beyond those 
that do not account for anticipated emotions (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Charpentier et 
al., 2016; Ahn et al., 2012; Hayes & Wedell, 2020). Moreover, not only can anticipated emotions 
be used to predict our choices, but inaccuracies in these forecasts may lead to suboptimal 
financial and medical decision making (Kermer et al., 2006; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Dunn & 
Laham, 2006; but see Sharot, 2011). Thus, the ability to accurately predict future feelings is 
essential to making optimal decisions. 
Forecasting abilities are typically assessed by having participants first predict how they 
would feel if a given event or outcome were to occur. Once the event occurs, participants report 
their experienced feelings. Forecasting accuracy can then be calculated as the difference between 
ratings of predicted and experienced feelings, where a larger discrepancy indicates a less 
accurate prediction and thus, poorer forecasting ability. Participants may be asked to predict one 
or more aspects of their future feelings including the valence, specific emotions, intensity, and 
duration (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Depending on the study, participants may anticipate their 
feelings to personal life events (e.g., attaining tenure, entering/exiting romantic relationships), 
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major national or world events (e.g., election outcomes), or experimental tasks designed to 
simulate processes that are also at play during real-world forecasting (e.g., viewing emotionally- 
evocative scenes).  
Despite affective forecasting’s importance, such predictions are not always accurate. 
Whereas forecasts of valence and the identification of future emotions are fairly precise (e.g., 
correctly predicting you’ll feel happy if your beloved sports team wins), predictions of how 
intense, and how long feelings will last, are more prone to error (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In 
general, there is a tendency for individuals to overestimate the intensity and duration of their 
feelings, known as the impact bias (Gilbert et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 2000; Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003). Some experts have claimed that the extent of the impact bias has been overstated, likely 
as a result of vague wording of the prompts used at the time of prediction (Levine et al., 2012; 
Lench et al., 2019). However, others continue to endorse the importance of impact bias (Wilson 
& Gilbert, 2013) and have proposed several explanations that can account for inaccurate 
forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2005). For example, when predicting future feelings, 
people may overestimate the impact of the target event while minimizing the influence of 
concurrent events (i.e., focalism; Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et al., 2000). Other 
accounts of forecasting error include the idea that people may ignore the mind’s tendency to 
rationalize the effectiveness of the so-called ‘psychological immune system’ that is responsible 
for reducing levels of negative affect (i.e., immune neglect; Gilbert et al., 1998; Halpern & 
Arnold, 2008). These misestimations may be further exacerbated by differences between the 
affective states at the time of prediction and at the time of experience (i.e., hot-cold empathy gap; 
Loewenstein, 2005). Notably, these accounts of inaccurate predictions are not mutually exclusive 
and it is likely that several factors contribute to errors in forecasting. 
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Given the multiple potential sources of error, it is unsurprising that people vary 
considerably in their forecasting accuracy (Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012a; Hoerger et 
al., 2016). That is, the degree of misestimation is not uniform across individuals, and some 
people are better forecasters than others. Hence, researchers have also examined individual 
difference variables that may explain person-to-person variation in forecasting accuracy. Such 
efforts have focused primarily on psychological traits that could conceivably predispose one to 
be more or less accurate at forecasting. One appealing idea is related to the notion of emotional 
intelligence, a construct that refers to the set of processes related to perceiving, understanding, 
and managing emotion (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004; Petrides & Furnham, 2001). Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that emotional intelligence underlies some variability in prediction 
accuracy, with at least two studies finding that those with higher emotional intelligence are also 
more accurate predictors of their future feelings (Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012a). 
Forecasting accuracy has also been linked to personality traits, such as openness and extraversion 
(Hoerger et al., 2016), and other studies have found that depressive symptoms are associated 
with more blunted positive, and more extreme negative, predictions (Strunk, Lopez, & 
DeRubeis, 2006; Wenze et al., 2012; Hoerger et al., 2012b; Marroquín & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2015).  
However, this dissertation takes a different approach to explaining forecasting error by 
focusing on the nature of the mental workspace in which affective forecasts are formulated. Our 
perspective is informed by the field of cognitive psychology, where it is well-established that 
individual differences in higher-order cognitive processes, such as planning and problem-
solving, are due, at least in part, to individual differences in cognitive working memory (Jonides, 
1995; Engle & Kane, 2003). That is, according to decades of research, variability in working 
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memory can predict performance on reasoning, reading comprehension, and other tasks where 
information must be kept on-line (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Kane et al., 2004; Unsworth et 
al., 2015). By analogy, we posit that affective working memory—a domain-specific working 
memory subsystem dedicated to the maintenance of feeling states—is crucial for higher-order 
emotion-based thought, including affective forecasting. If affective working memory provides 
the mental workspace that supports emotional prospection, then individual differences in the 
working memory for emotion should account for variability in the accuracy of a persons’ 
forecasts.  
Affective Working Memory 
Working memory refers to the ability to hold information at the forefront of our minds 
(Baddeley, 1992; Miyake and Shah, 1999). For example, when we perform mental arithmetic, or 
consider a seating arrangement for a dinner party, we are using our working memory abilities. 
We can hold emotions in mind as well (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Mikels et al., 2005; 2008). For 
example, when we consider going out to eat or ordering food in, we must keep the associated 
feelings in mind for comparison in order to make a decision. This ability to maintain and work 
with feeling states is called affective working memory (Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2019). 
Affective working memory reflects a distinct domain of working memory responsible for 
actively holding emotional experiences in mind in the service of goal directed thought and 
behavior. 
To measure the ability to maintain subjective experiences of emotion, Mikels and 
colleagues (2003; 2005; 2008) designed a novel emotion maintenance task. In this task, 
participants view one emotional image and maintain the feelings evoked by the image over a 
delay. Another emotional image is then presented and participants must decide if the second 
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image elicited feelings with more or less emotional intensity (i.e., strength or amount of 
emotional reaction) compared to the first. Other versions of the task remove the comparison to a 
second image, and participants maintain the elicited feelings before categorizing them as having 
either high or low emotional intensity (Waugh, Lemus, & Gotlib, 2014; Waugh et al., 2019). In 
both versions, ratings of emotional intensity from all images are collected separately and then 
used to determine how participants should have responded during the maintenance task. Higher 
emotion-maintenance accuracy scores reflect a superior ability to hold emotions in mind, 
therefore, better affective working memory. 
Affective working memory can be characterized by its separability from other mental 
processes including cognitive working memory, working memory for emotionally-laden stimuli, 
and the passive experience of emotion. We consider each of these in turn. First, evidence 
indicates that affective working memory is dissociable from cognitive (i.e., non-affective) 
working memory abilities. When developing the emotion maintenance task, the authors also 
created a perceptual maintenance task that assesses the ability to maintain brightness information 
(Mikels, 2003; Mikels et al., 2005; 2008). This companion task was designed to measure non-
affective maintenance in an analogous manner to that of the emotion maintenance task; both 
maintenance tasks require assessments of the intensity of subjective experiences evoked from 
pictorial stimuli. In this task, participants hold the brightness intensity (i.e., amount of overall 
light or illumination) of a neutral image in mind over a delay before deciding if a second neutral 
image has more or less brightness intensity compared to the first (Mikels et al., 2005, 2008; 
Broome et al., 2012). The emotion and brightness maintenance tasks have been used in several 
studies to demonstrate the dissociation between maintenance of affective and non-affective 
information (Mikels et al., 2005; 2008). Using selective interference methodology, Mikels et al. 
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(2008) found that concurrent performance of a secondary affective task interrupted emotion, but 
not brightness-maintenance accuracy, whereas completing a secondary cognitive task impaired 
brightness-maintenance, but facilitated emotion-maintenance performance. Additionally, Mikels 
and colleagues (2005) found that while younger adults outperformed older adults on the 
brightness maintenance task, older adults performed comparably to younger adults on the 
emotion maintenance task. This finding is consistent with the relative preservation of emotional 
processing abilities seen in older age despite robust age-related cognitive decline (Mather, 2016). 
Further support of the separability between cognitive and affective working memory comes from 
a study reporting that individuals with schizophrenia, who have known emotional processing 
deficits (Kring & Elis, 2013), show emotion-maintenance impairments above and beyond those 
seen on the brightness maintenance task (Gard et al., 2011). 
According to Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz (2019), affective working memory constitutes a 
distinct mode of emotion–working memory interaction responsible for the maintenance of 
emotional feelings themselves, rather than emotional stimuli more generally (e.g., emotional 
photos, words, faces). When maintaining emotional stimuli actively in mind, unless otherwise 
directed, the focus of attention is on the stimulus content and not necessarily on the emotional 
feeling state that the words or images may have evoked. That is, while verbal working memory is 
at play when holding sad emotional words in mind, affective working memory is engaged when 
maintaining and working with the specific feelings of sadness evoked by the emotionally laden 
words. 
Moreover, affective working memory is dissociable from purely experiencing emotion. 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies support the idea that emotion maintenance reflects an active 
process of holding emotional experiences online that is distinct from the passive experience of 
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emotion. For example, emotion maintenance, as compared to passive viewing of emotional 
images, was shown to increase activation of the dorsal medial frontal cortex (DMFC; Waugh, 
Lemus, & Goltib, 2014; Smith et al., 2017), part of the ‘mentalizing network’ associated with 
emotion appraisal and regulation (Amodio & Frith, 2006), and the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC; Waugh et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2017), an area associated with working memory and 
other executive functioning (Smith & Jonides, 1999; D’esposito & Postle, 2015). Additionally, 
another study found prolonged activation of the amygdala after emotion maintenance that was 
not seen after simply experiencing the emotions (Schaefer et al., 2002). Further evidence of a 
distinction between passive experience and active maintenance of emotions comes from 
behavioral work that used cognitive load manipulations (DeFraine, 2016). In this study, 
participants reported that concurrent performance of another mental task reduced the intensity of 
feelings while experiencing, but not maintaining, feeling states. Thus, affective working memory 
appears to reflect a unique ability to actively hold emotions in mind. 
As stated earlier, we know that cognitive working memory supports goal-directed 
behavior and that variability in working memory can predict higher-order cognitive processing 
(Kane et al., 2004). Similarly, affective working memory is hypothesized to operate in service of 
subsequent goals and that individuals differ in their ability to maintain emotional experiences. 
Thus, affective working memory may play a comparable role as cognitive working memory 
providing the mental workspace that supports higher-order mental abilities in the affective 
domain. In this dissertation, we test the idea that affective working memory underlies one such 




Overview of the Dissertation  
In the present dissertation, we investigate affective working memory as a potential 
mechanism underlying affective forecasting. Because affective forecasting requires conjuring up 
and maintaining emotional experiences for evaluation, we hypothesized that individuals who are 
better able to maintain feeling states (i.e., superior affective working memory), would be more 
accurate in predicting their future feelings. If this hypothesis is correct, then individual 
differences in the ability to maintain emotional experiences should predict variability in the 
accuracy of affective forecasts. Evidence of such a relationship could inform future development 
of an information processing model of affective forecasting that articulates the specific roles of 
constituent psychological processes, including affective working memory, in accurate 
prospection. 
In Chapter 2, we present findings from a series of three studies (Frank et al., 2021) that 
test the hypothesis that affective, but not cognitive, working memory supports affective 
forecasting accuracy. To measure working memory abilities, participants completed the emotion 
maintenance and brightness maintenance tasks described above (Mikels, 2003; Mikels et al., 
2005; 2008; Broome et al., 2012). To measure affective forecasting, participants reported their 
predicted and experienced feelings to viewing emotionally-evocative photographs in the 
laboratory. In Study 1, we find that emotion-maintenance performance predicts forecasting 
accuracy, whereas brightness-maintenance performance does not. In Study 2, we replicate this 
selective relationship between emotion, but not brightness, maintenance and forecasting accuracy 
within the same group of participants. And in Study 3, we more firmly establish the finding that 
forecasting ability is not independently predicted by performance on the brightness maintenance 
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task, or other measures of cognitive working memory. Furthermore, we find no support, across 
several studies, that emotional intelligence is associated with forecasting accuracy. 
In Chapter 3, we present results from one experiment (Study 4) that examines whether 
the relationship between affective working memory and forecasting accuracy generalizes to a 
real-world event by measuring predicted and experienced feelings to the outcome of the 2020 
United States presidential election. Moreover, unlike the prior studies in this dissertation which 
were all conducted in-person, with college students run in a laboratory setting, Study 4 was 
conducted entirely online with participants recruited nationwide, thereby establishing another 
dimension to the generality of the effects. We found that the selective relationship between 
emotion, but not brightness, maintenance and forecasting accuracy was further replicated in this 
broader sample of participants that used forecasted feelings to a real-world event. The theoretical 
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 A Selective Relationship between Affective Working Memory and                               
Affective Forecasting (Studies 1, 2, & 3) 
 
Our decisions are often guided by the feelings we anticipate in response to potential 
outcomes. Indeed, the ability to predict one’s future feelings, known as affective forecasting 
(AF) (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), is thought to play an important role in decisions, preferences, 
and behaviors that affect health and economic outcomes, and personal well-being. However, 
people are often biased and inaccurate when predicting their future feelings (Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003; Mathieu & Gosling, 2012). Therefore, understanding the elemental processes that 
contribute to AF may provide valuable insight into why AF is flawed and how it can be 
improved. We posit that AF entails the ability to actively maintain and evaluate emotional 
feelings, and thus requires affective working memory (AWM). AWM maintains feeling states 
actively in mind to support goal-oriented behavior (Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & 
Carstensen, 2005; Mikels, Reuter-Lorenz, Beyer, & Fredrickson, 2008; Smith & Lane, 2015; see 
Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2019, for a review). If AWM is a core ability underlying AF, then 
individual differences in AWM should influence the accuracy of AF. The goal of the present 
report is to test this hypothesis. 
Affective forecasts typically rely on self-reports in which participants predict how they 
will feel about future stimuli or events (Andrews & Robinson, 1991; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). 
Some studies ask participants to predict their feelings to outcomes of genuine future events such 
as football games or presidential elections (Wilson et al., 2000; Scheibe, Mata, & Carstensen, 
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2011). Others use laboratory tests that entail verbal descriptions of emotional scenes and require 
participants to predict how they would feel subsequently when viewing the actual scene 
(Robinson & Clore, 2001; Hoerger, Chapman, Epstein, & Duberstein, 2012). In each case, AF 
ability is assessed by measuring the discrepancy between ratings of predicted feelings and ratings 
of feelings experienced at a later time, in order to determine the prediction-accuracy score, also 
referred to as absolute accuracy (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Mathieu & Gosling, 2012). 
Participants may be asked to predict how long or how frequently they will feel a given emotion 
or the degree to which an event or stimulus will affect their mood. Any distinct feature of 
predicted emotion can be used as criteria for AF accuracy.  
The present study used ratings of emotional intensity, or predictions of how strongly 
participants will feel in response to a particular event. The tendency to overestimate the 
emotional impact, including the emotional intensity, of a future outcome is known as the “impact 
bias” (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). For example, impact bias may be demonstrated by a student who 
overestimates how positive they expect to feel if they were to receive a high exam score. Some 
evidence suggests that emotional intensity is only moderately overestimated (Mathieu & 
Gosling, 2012) and other work suggests the bias may disappear depending on how emotional 
ratings are collected (Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2012). Still, others maintain that the 
impact bias is “alive and well” (Wilson & Gilbert, 2013). Regardless, there is substantial 
evidence for individual differences in AF performance (Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-James, 
Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007, Hoerger et al., 2012; Hoerger, Chapman, & Duberstein, 2016) 
for which the mechanisms are not yet understood. To the extent that AWM plays a mechanistic 
role in AF, AWM may be an underlying source of inter-individual variability in AF. Therefore, 
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the primary goal of the present investigation was to determine whether AWM is related to, and 
predictive of, individual differences in forecasting of emotional intensity. 
 Working memory is a limited capacity system that temporarily maintains information 
actively in mind (Baddeley, 1992, 2007, 2012) in support of goal-directed behavior, planning 
and problem-solving (Smith & Jonides, 1999). According to current models, working memory is 
composed of separable, domain-specific subsystems specialized for the short-term maintenance 
of different types of information (e.g., visual, verbal, spatial) (Repovš & Baddeley, 2006; 
Baddeley, 2012). Affective working memory is posited to be an additional domain-specific 
subsystem specialized for maintaining emotional feelings actively in mind over a brief interval 
(Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2019; cf. LeDoux & Brown, 2017). Previous studies have measured 
AWM using an affect maintenance task in which participants view an emotional image, then 
assess and hold their emotional reaction (i.e., the intensity of their feelings) in mind over a delay. 
Participants then view another emotional image and determine if the second image evoked an 
emotional response with higher or lower intensity than the first picture in the pair (Mikels et al., 
2005, 2008; Broome, Gard & Mikels, 2012). To determine if the ability to maintain an emotional 
feeling can be dissociated from working memory for affectively “neutral” information, previous 
investigations have used an analogous visual working memory task that measures non-affective 
maintenance abilities. In this task, participants assess and hold the brightness intensity of a 
neutral image in mind over a delay before deciding if a second image has higher or lower 
brightness intensity (Mikels et al., 2005, 2008; Broome et al., 2012). The brightness maintenance 
task is particularly well-suited for comparison with the affect maintenance task; both require the 
subjective assessment of pictorial stimuli (IAPS images; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1999) and a 
response decision based on assessing the relative intensity of subjective states evoked by two 
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consecutive stimuli offset by a brief delay (Mikels et al., 2008). Furthermore, accuracy on both 
tasks can be scored using subjective intensity ratings. Following the maintenance phase of each 
task, participants rate the intensity (emotional or brightness) of each image used in the 
maintenance tasks. These ratings are then used to establish individualized accuracy scores for the 
respective maintenance task.  
Several lines of research using variants of these tasks provide converging evidence that 
AWM is a separable subsystem that is at least partially dissociable from working memory for 
non-emotional, visual information (Mikels et al., 2005, 2008; see also Gard et al., 2011). Using 
selective interference methodology, Mikels and his colleagues (2008) found that a secondary 
emotion regulation task impaired performance on the affect maintenance task but not the 
brightness maintenance task. Conversely, a secondary cognitive task impaired performance on 
the brightness maintenance task but facilitated performance on the affect maintenance task, 
suggesting the dissociability of working memory for affective versus non-affective information 
(Mikels et al., 2008). Further evidence for this conclusion derives from findings that older adults 
performed comparably to younger adults on the affect maintenance task, but they were 
significantly impaired on the brightness maintenance task (Mikels et al., 2005). This pattern is 
consistent with the relative preservation of affective processing abilities in older adults despite 
cognitive decline that accompanies normal aging (Mather, 2016). Taken together, these studies 
suggest that AWM is dissociable from non-affective working memory, a property that was tested 
further in the present investigation. 
Additionally, prior research points to a potential relationship between AF and emotional 
intelligence (EI)—a set of skills related to the assessment, management, regulation, and 
expression of emotion, and the use of feelings to succeed in everyday life (Dunn, Brackett, 
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Ashton-James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012; Salovey, Mayer,  & 
Caruso, 2004). There are a variety of models (Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Salovey et al., 2004) 
and measures of the EI construct (see Hughes & Evans, 2018 for a recent review). Previous 
studies have identified relationships between AF and EI (albeit with some inconsistency) and 
these were generally hypothesized to be due to differences in basic emotion processing—such as 
the ability to identify, remember, and manage emotions (Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 
2102)—which could also relate to AWM. Thus, an ancillary goal of the present investigation was 
to reassess the relationships between trait and ability EI and AF, and to explore the potential 
relationships between AWM and EI. We expected that a better ability to maintain feeling states 
would be associated with superior EI and more successful AF. 
In the first set of studies, 1a and 1b, we examined the relationship between AF and 
AWM, and between AF and visual working memory, respectively, in two independent samples 
of participants. We predicted there would be a positive relationship between AWM and AF 
(Study 1a), but no relationship between visual working memory and AF (Study 1b). Study 2 
sought to replicate this selectivity within a new group of participants. Study 3 aimed to 
strengthen the evidence by replicating and extending the results using a pre-registered study. 
Evidence for these predictions would lend credence to the idea that AWM is a fundamental 
capacity that contributes to the accuracy of affective forecasts and provide additional evidence 
that AWM is dissociable from working memory for non-affective information. 
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Study 1a: Testing the relationship between AWM and AF Ability 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-nine undergraduate students participated in the study in exchange for course 
credit. One participant chose not to continue in the study after seeing the sample emotional 
images, three participants did not return for Session 2 (see Design and Procedures) and one 
participant failed to follow task instructions, resulting in the exclusion of these five participants. 
In addition, eight participants were excluded due to poor performance on the affect maintenance 
task (see below for details). Thus, the reported analyses were performed on data from 66 
participants (63.5% female, mean age 18.83, 71.6% self-identified White), who self-reported as 
right-handed and native English-speakers. A power analysis based on data from Hoerger et al. 
(2012) Study 2 (N = 430), that used a similar AF task to measure the relationship between AF 
and a different variable of interest (i.e., emotional intelligence; see below), indicated we needed 
46 participants to have 80% power for detecting a small-medium effect with the traditional alpha 
= .05 criterion of statistical significance (G*Power 3.1: Faul, Erfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009). 
Our initial sample size exceeded the estimate to account for expected attrition and low 
performing individuals. The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved all 
procedures, and all participants provided informed consent prior to participating. 
Design and Procedures 
Participants completed two one-hour testing sessions, scheduled one week apart (see 
Figure 2-1). During the first session, participants performed 40 trials of the affect maintenance 
task, followed by Phase I of the AF task. Phase I of the AF task was the prediction phase, where 
participants were instructed to predict their future feelings based on a written description of a 
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scene. During the second session, participants completed Phase II of the AF task, where 
participants were instructed to rate their experienced feelings after viewing an image of the 
scene. After Phase II of the AF task, participants completed another 40 trials of the affect 
maintenance task. This task sequence was intended to minimize the influence of the affect 
maintenance task on emotional ratings of the AF task between Phase I and Phase II. Finally, 
participants rated the emotional intensity of all images included in the maintenance task. All 
tasks were performed on a PC desktop computer with E-Prime (Version 2.0.10, 2013), and are 
described, in turn, below.  
 23 
 
Figure 2-1. Protocols for Study 1a, Study 1b, Study 2, and Study 3. 
 
Affect Maintenance Task. The affect maintenance task (Figure 2-2) was similar to that 
employed in previous research measuring AWM (Mikels et al., 2005, Mikels et al., 2008, 
Broome et al., 2012). For each trial, participants viewed one emotional picture (5s) and were 
instructed to maintain the feelings elicited by this image. A retention interval ensued (3s) before 
participants viewed a second emotional picture (5s). Next, a green cross appeared, which 
prompted participants to report whether the second image had higher or lower emotional 
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intensity than the first one. Emotional intensity was described to the participants as the strength 
or magnitude of their emotional reaction to each image, regardless of the picture’s content. 
Participants responded to each trial by pressing either a key labeled “H” for higher or “L” for 
lower.  
There were 80 trials total and each trial consisted of a pair of images selected to have 
matching valence (40 positive and 40 negative trials). We used the stimuli selected by Broome et 
al. (2012), consisting of 80 matched-valence pairs created from a set of 160 images (80 positive, 
80 negative). Images depicted pleasant (positive valence) or unpleasant (negative valence) scenes 
selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999) and supplemented from an in-house database to 
include 17 additional high arousal images (available upon request). Intensity ratings from all 
images were originally obtained from two independent samples (N1 = 40 & N2 = 40; Mikels et 
al., 2008) and were recorded using a 7-point scale that ranged from low (1) to high (7) emotional 
intensity, or degree of emotional reaction to each image. The difference in emotional intensity 
ratings between the two images in these pairs varied from 0.23 to 1.75 (M = .99, SD = .47). As in 
previous work with this image set, this difference, referred to as intensity distance, was used to 
categorize the stimulus set into near (intensity distance .88 or below) and far (intensity distance 
1.03 or greater) pairs, resulting in 38 near pairs and 42 far pairs. Additionally, for each intensity 
distance subset, the second picture had higher intensity than the first for exactly half of the pairs, 
and vice versa for the other half. Following Broome et al., (2012), the 80 pairs were divided into 
two blocks (Image Sets A and B) such that they were equated for valence, intensity distance 
(near or far) and intensity order (second picture higher or lower), and their presentation at each 
of the two sessions was counterbalanced across participants. These restrictions were to ensure 
there would be no differences in performance due to the image sets, which was later confirmed 
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by our participants, t(65) = .46, p = .63. Trials within each block were presented in a randomized 
order for each participant.  
 
 
Figure 2-2. Schematic of maintenance tasks used in Studies 1–3. Participants hold the emotional 
or brightness intensity of one image in mind over a delay to determine if a subsequent image has 
higher or lower intensity. Image adapted from “Affective Working Memory: An Integrative 
Psychological Construct” by J. A. Mikels and P. A. Reuter-Lorenz, 2019, Perspectives in 
Psychological Science, 14(4), p. 8. Copyright 2019 by SAGE Publications. 
 
Affective Forecasting. During the first session of the AF task (i.e., Phase I; see Figure 2-
3), participants read a description of a scene and were asked to imagine it. Participants then 
predicted how they would feel if they were to view the actual image and rated this feeling on a 
visual analog scale (actual resolution: 21 points) that ranged from endpoint anchors labelled 
“very unpleasant” to “very pleasant”. Participants read ten such descriptions and rated their 
predicted feelings for each by clicking the computer mouse anywhere along the scale. During 
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Session 2, one week later (i.e., Phase II; see Figure 2-3), participants viewed the images 
associated with each description and rated how each one made them feel using the same scale. 
Five negative (mean pleasure rating = 2.35, SD = 0.68) and five positive (mean pleasure rating = 
7.42, SD = 0.69) images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 
1999) were used, based on those used in Robinson & Clore (2001). Five of the images were the 
same as in Robinson and Clore (2001); to avoid repeating images already employed in the affect 
maintenance task, the other five images were replaced with alternative IAPS images matched as 
closely as possible in content to those used by Robinson and Clore (2001). Accordingly, five 
descriptions were taken from Robinson and Clore (2001) and the remaining were constructed to 
match the new replacement images (see Table 2-3 in Appendix 2A for image descriptions used 
in the current study). Descriptions and images were displayed on a desktop computer screen, and 
the order of stimuli was randomized for each participant independently for Phase I and Phase II. 
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Figure 2-3. Schematic of the affective forecasting task used in Studies 1–3. During Phase I, 
participants read brief affectively laden descriptions of scenes and predict how they would feel if 
they were to view each image described. After a one-week break, during Phase II, participants 
view each image and rate their experienced feelings. 
 
Emotional Intensity Ratings. Accuracy on the affect maintenance task was scored on an 
individualized basis using each participant’s subjective ratings of emotional intensity for each 
image (see Affective Forecasting and Maintenance Task Scoring for details). In order to obtain 
subjective ratings of emotional intensity, participants viewed all images from the affect 
maintenance task again individually, at the end of the second session. The rating task was 
performed at the end of session two in order to minimize the possibility that the process of rating 
the images or that memory of prior ratings would contaminate relative intensity judgments and 
influence performance on the affect maintenance task. Images were randomly assigned to one of 
four blocks and trials within each block were presented in a randomized order. Participants were 
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reminded that emotional intensity referred to the strength or magnitude of their emotional 
reaction. Then, using a visual analog scale that ranged from “not intense” to “extremely intense,” 
displayed below the image, participants rated the intensity of their feelings for each image. 
Responses were registered by a mouse click anywhere on the scale corresponding to the intensity 
of their feelings. The scale had a resolution of 21 units and ratings were used to calculate affect 
maintenance accuracy scores, as described below (see Affect Maintenance Accuracy Scores). 
Additional Measures 
 We assessed the participant’s visual imagery ability to control for its potential influence 
on the AF task. Due to significant relationships between emotional intelligence (EI) and AF 
found in previous studies, we also included trait and ability measures of emotional intelligence to 
see if the results would replicate here (Dunn et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012). These additional 
measures were administered at the end of the first testing session (see Figure 2-1 for the 
complete order of tasks). We also assessed the participants’ emotional state before and after each 
session to ensure they were not negatively influenced by the stimuli viewed in the study. These 
measures are briefly described, in turn, below.  
Visual Imagery. Visual imagery was assessed with the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). The self-report measure asks participants to answer four 
questions about each of four imagined scenes, and to rate vividness on a 5-point scale of 
vividness. A response of ‘1’ represents “perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision” and ‘5’ 
represents “no image at all, you only know that you are thinking of the object.” Scores for all 16 
items were summed to create a composite VVIQ score where higher scores indicate poorer 
imaging capabilities (scores range from 16 to 80). 
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Emotional Intelligence. Based on previous findings revealing relationships between AF 
and EI, we employed the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU;  = .77; range: 0 
– 1, MacCann & Roberts, 2008) to assess ability EI and the Assessing Emotions Scale (AES;  = 
.87 – .90; scores range from 33 to 165, Schutte et al., 1998), also known as the Schutte 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (Schutte, Makiyff, & Bhullar, 2009), to assess trait EI.  
Emotional State. To assess potential changes in emotional state due to participating in 
the study, the “state” version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; positive items 
 = .89, negative items  = .85; Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988) was administered at the 
beginning and end of each testing session. The scale consists of twenty words that describe 
feelings and emotions. For each word, participants are asked to rate the extent they feel that way 
“right now, that is, at the present moment” from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). This measure was 
used only to ensure that the subjects’ emotional states were not negatively impacted by the 
stimuli shown in our experiment and will not be discussed further.  
Affective Forecasting and Maintenance Task Scoring 
Affect Maintenance Accuracy Scores. Accuracy scoring was individualized based on 
each participant’s image ratings from the emotional intensity rating task. These subjective 
intensity ratings were used to infer which image, when appearing with its pair, would be judged 
by that individual as having higher intensity. A response on the affect maintenance task was 
scored correct when it agreed with the participant’s relative intensity ratings for the members of 
each pair. Trials with images receiving equal intensity ratings were excluded from the calculation 
of that participant’s accuracy scores. On average, approximately six of each participant’s 80 total 
trials, or 7.8% (SD = 3.02%) of all trials, were excluded for this reason. For each participant, 
accuracy scores were calculated as the sum of the affect maintenance responses that matched the 
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intensity-based comparisons and divided by the number of trials included in the sum. Separate 
accuracy scores were calculated for each session and then averaged together to calculate a 
composite affect maintenance accuracy score. As mentioned above, eight participants were 
excluded from all subsequent analyses because they performed more than two standard 
deviations below the sample mean during either session. This level of performance was 
approximately 50% accuracy, suggesting participants were merely guessing, or otherwise not 
following instructions. 
AF Scores. AF prediction-accuracy scores were calculated based on the difference 
between the predicted rating in response to the picture description and the feeling rating in 
response to viewing the image for each participant. The absolute value of this difference was 
subtracted from the largest possible deviation score (i.e., 10), thus providing an AF score 
between zero (least accurate prediction) and 10 (most accurate prediction). For each participant, 
we averaged the scores across the ten images to calculate a composite AF score (see also Dunn et 
al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012). Because we hypothesized that AWM would contribute to AF 
accuracy per se, we focused on magnitude, rather than the direction (i.e., overestimation vs. 
underestimation) of AF errors (see Appendix 2B for exploratory analyses on directionality). 
Results  
Descriptive statistics for affective forecasting (AF), affective maintenance, and vividness 
of visual imagery (VVIQ) are presented in Table 2-1. As can be seen from this table, in this and 
all subsequent studies, participants performed the affective maintenance task reasonably well, 
and were comfortably below ceiling.  Likewise, AF performance was on average reasonably 
accurate but falling below a perfect 10 by approximately 2.5 points. 
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N = 66 
Study 1b 
N = 68 
Study 2 
N = 96 
Study 3 
N = 85 
Affective 
Forecasting 
7.48 (0.85) 7.35 (0.90) 7.61 (0.89) 7.70 (0.78) 
Affect 
Maintenance 
0.77 (0.06) NA 0.81 (0.09) 0.81 (0.08) 
Brightness 
Maintenance 
NA 0.78 (0.08) 0.85 (0.08) 0.80 (0.08) 
VVIQ 38.6 (9.08) 39.4 (9.48) 37.5 (9.85) 38.5 (10.8) 
Range of Scores. Affective Forecasting: 0–10, Affect Maintenance: 0–1, Brightness Maintenance: 0–1, and VVIQ: 
16–80, where a score approaching 16 reflects the greatest reported imaging ability and a score approaching 80 
reflects the poorest abilities. 
 
A multiple linear regression tested whether affective maintenance accuracy and VVIQ 
scores predicted AF performance. Results indicated this model was significant, (F(2,63) = 5.47, 
p = .006) with an R2 = .15. As predicted, affect maintenance accuracy contributed significantly to 
the model,  = 0.32, p = .008 (see Figure 2-4). Additionally, VVIQ scores also contributed 




Figure 2-4. Scatterplots showing forecasting accuracy plotted as a function of maintenance task 
performance in Study 1. The graphs (with best fitting regression line and 95% confidence 
interval shaded region) show that AF accuracy is significantly predicted by affect maintenance 
accuracy (left; Study 1a) but not brightness maintenance accuracy (right; Study 1b) using 
independent samples. 
Ancillary Analyses 
In an effort to replicate correlations found in previous research, the relationship between 
AF and EI was assessed using Pearson’s r correlation coefficient (see Table 2-2 for EI scores). 
Neither the relationship between AF and trait EI (r(62) = .06, p = .62) nor between AF and 
ability EI were significant, r(64) = –.04, p = .75. Affect maintenance accuracy was also unrelated 
to either measure of EI (trait: r(62) = –.13, p = .32; ability: r(64) = –.07, p = .55). 
 




N = 66 
Study 1b 
N = 68 
Study 2 
N = 96 
EI – Ability .68 (.08) .68 (.1) .68 (.07) 
EI – Trait 120.8 (8.3) 122.0 (12.3) 123.0 (11.9) 
Range of Scores. EI–Ability: 0–1, EI–Trait: 33–165 
 
 = 0.32 
p = .008 
 = 0.2 
p = .102 
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Discussion 
Results from the first study, while correlational, provide initial support for the hypothesis 
that AWM plays a role in AF. The positive relationship observed between emotion maintenance 
ability and AF motivates the question of specificity: Is the association between AWM and AF 
due to the short-term maintenance of emotional information per se, or does it reflect a more 
general role for working memory? Therefore, Study 1b examined the relationship between AF 
and visual working memory using the brightness maintenance task originally designed as the 
non-affective analogue of the affect maintenance task. It requires participants to maintain in 
mind the brightness intensity of an emotionally neutral image over a delay, to compare with the 
brightness of a subsequent neutral image (Mikels et al., 2005, Mikels et al., 2008; Broome et al., 
2012). In contrast to affect maintenance, we predicted that the ability to maintain representations 
of brightness intensity would have no relationship with AF ability. Study 1a also found a 
correlation between AF and visual imagery as measured by the VVIQ. This measure is included 
in Study 1b and subsequent studies to assess the reliability of this relationship. 
Study 1b: Testing the relationship between Visual Working Memory and AF Ability 
Method 
Participants 
A new sample of seventy-eight undergraduate students participated in Study 1b. Sixty-
nine participated in the study in exchange for course credit, while nine participated for monetary 
compensation in order to continue data collection during a university break. Three participants 
did not return to complete Session 2 and were therefore excluded. In addition, data from five 
participants were excluded due to poor performance on the brightness maintenance task (see 
below for details), and one participant was excluded for being under the age of 18 at the time of 
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testing, in accordance with our inclusion criteria. Thus, the present analyses were performed on 
data from 68 participants (66.2% female, mean age 18.86, 67.6% self-identified White), who 
self-reported as right-handed and native English-speakers. The sample size was selected to 
parallel Study 1a, over-recruited to account for attrition and low-performing participants. The 
University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved all procedures, and all participants 
provided informed consent prior to participating. 
Design and Procedures 
Participants completed two one-hour testing sessions, scheduled one week apart (see Figure 2-1). 
The experimental design and tasks were the same as Study 1a, except for the use of the 
brightness maintenance task and corresponding brightness rating task. All tasks were performed 
on a PC desktop computer with E-Prime (Version 2.0.10, 2013).  
Brightness Maintenance Task. In the brightness maintenance task, participants viewed 
one neutral image (5s) and were instructed to maintain the brightness intensity actively in mind. 
A retention interval ensued (3s) before participants viewed a second neutral image (5s). Next, a 
green cross appeared, which prompted participants to report whether the second image had 
higher or lower brightness intensity than the first one. Brightness intensity was described to 
participants as the magnitude of overall light or illumination in the image, regardless of the 
picture’s content. Participants responded to each trial by pressing either a key labeled “H” for 
higher or “L” for lower (Figure 2-2). There were 80 trials total where each trial consisted of one 
pair of two neutral images. We used the same 80 pairs as in Broome et al. (2012). Images were 
neutral scenes selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1999) to ensure that performance would be 
independent from emotional processes. Intensity ratings from images were obtained previously 
(N = 40; Pilot Study C, Mikels et al., 2008) and recorded using a 7-point scale that ranged from 
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low (1) to high (7) brightness intensity, or overall light or illumination of each image. The 
difference in brightness intensity between images in these pairs, or intensity distance, varied 
from 0.10 to 2.98 (M = 1.28, SD = .80) and consonant with previous work using this image set, 
pairs were divided into two groups: near (intensity distance 1.13 or below) and far (intensity 
distance 1.15 or greater), resulting in 40 near pairs and 40 far pairs. Additionally, for each 
intensity distance subset, the second picture would have higher intensity than the first for exactly 
half of the pairs. Furthermore, to establish whether image order affected performance, half of the 
participants viewed one intensity order and half viewed the same pairs with the image order 
reversed. This manipulation had no effect on performance and will not be discussed further, t(66) 
= 0.59, p = .555. Each order variant of the 80 pairs was divided into sets (Set A and Set B) with 
equal number of trials for intensity distance (near and far) and intensity order (second image 
higher or lower intensity) and their presentation at each of the two sessions was counterbalanced 
across participants. This was intended to minimize performance differences due to the image 
sets, and proved to be effective, t(67) = –1.18, p = .244. Within these restrictions, pair order was 
randomized individually for each participant. 
Brightness Intensity Ratings. At the end of the second session, participants viewed all 
images from the brightness maintenance task again and rated the “intensity” or magnitude of 
overall light or illumination they perceived for each one. Ratings were collected after the 
maintenance task to avoid the potential influence of prior ratings on brightness maintenance 
performance. Each picture was displayed individually above a visual analog scale that ranged 
from “not intense” to “extremely intense”. Participants responded by clicking anywhere on the 
scale below the picture to indicate the intensity of their perceived brightness for each image. The 
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scale had an actual resolution of 21 units and ratings were used to calculate the brightness 
maintenance accuracy scores (see Brightness Maintenance Accuracy Scores below). 
Maintenance Task Scoring 
Brightness Maintenance Accuracy Scores. Similar to the calculation of affect 
maintenance accuracy, brightness maintenance accuracy scoring was individualized using each 
participant’s ratings from the brightness intensity-rating task. These subjective ratings were used 
to infer which image, when appearing with its pair, would be judged by that individual as having 
higher intensity. A response in the brightness maintenance task was considered correct when it 
agreed with the participant’s relative intensity ratings for the members of each pair. Trials with 
images receiving equal intensity ratings were excluded from the calculation of that participant’s 
accuracy scores (M = 7.4% (SD = 4.0%) of all responses). For each participant, accuracy scores 
were calculated as the sum of the brightness maintenance responses that matched the intensity-
based comparisons and divided by the number of included responses. Separate accuracy scores 
were calculated for each session and then averaged together to calculate a composite brightness 
maintenance accuracy score. As mentioned above, six participants were excluded from analyses 
because they performed more than two standard deviations below the mean during either session. 
These participants performed at approximately 50% accuracy, suggesting they were guessing or 
otherwise not following instructions.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics for affective forecasting (AF), brightness maintenance task 
performance, and vividness of visual imagery (VVIQ) are presented in Table 2-1. Performance 
on the brightness maintenance task was reasonable, below ceiling, and well matched with 
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accuracy on the affective maintenance task in the prior study. AF performance was similar to that 
in Study 1a.  
A multiple linear regression was computed to determine if brightness maintenance 
accuracy and VVIQ scores were significant predictors of AF performance. This model was not 
significant, (F(2, 65) = 1.34, p = .268) with an R2 = .04, and neither brightness maintenance 
performance ( = 0.2, p = .108; see Figure 2-4) nor visual imagery ability ( = –0.007, p = .953) 
contributed significantly to the model. 
Ancillary Analyses 
As in Study 1a, we tested the relationships between AF and EI and found that neither the 
relationship between AF and trait EI (r(66) = .15, p = .21) nor between AF and ability EI (r(66) 
= .14, p = .26) was significant. Brightness maintenance accuracy was not related to trait EI (r(66) 
= –.09, p = .48) but brightness maintenance accuracy and ability EI were related, r(66) = .30, p = 
.01. 
Discussion 
 As predicted, the results from Study 1b provide no indication that brightness maintenance 
ability is related to AF. Note also that the VVIQ was not associated with AF in this sample. 
Separately then, the results of Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that AF ability is selectively related 
to affect maintenance. However, because these relationships were examined using two different 
samples, it was not possible to assess the contribution of one maintenance ability while adjusting 
for the effect of the other. Therefore, the hypothesis that predicting future feelings is specifically 
related to affective working memory ability was further tested in a second study using both 
maintenance tasks in a within-subjects design. Study 2 aimed to replicate the specific 
relationship observed in Study 1 between AF and affect maintenance and allowed us to compare 
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the extent to which performance on each maintenance task predicted AF ability. We expected 
that only affect maintenance would be a significant predictor of AF ability, whereas brightness 
maintenance would not. 




A new sample of one-hundred and ten undergraduate students participated in Study 2 for 
course credit. One participant chose not to continue in the study after seeing the sample 
emotional images, two participants did not return for Session 2, and four participants failed to 
follow instructions, resulting in the exclusion of these seven participants. Due to experimenter 
error, another participant performed an incorrect version of the task and their data was excluded. 
Additional exclusions included five participants who did not meet performance inclusion criteria 
for the maintenance tasks as described in Studies 1a and 1b (see below for details) and one 
clearly outlying participant who performed more than 3.5 standard deviations below the mean on 
the AF task (Note: When this 3.5 SD criterion for the AF was retroactively applied to Studies 1a 
and 1b, no outliers were identified). Thus, the present analyses were performed on data from 96 
participants (63.5% female, mean age 18.8, 67% self-identified White), who were self-reported 
right-handers and native English-speakers. A power analysis based on predictor correlations 
from Studies 1a and 1b indicated 81 participants would yield 80% power for detecting a small-
medium effect at the traditional alpha = .05 criterion of statistical significance (G*Power 3.1: 
Faul, Erfelder, Buchner & Lang, 2009). We oversampled to account for attrition and low 
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performing individuals. The University of Michigan Institutional Review Board approved all 
procedures, and all participants provided informed consent prior to participating. 
Design and Procedures 
All participants performed tasks used in Studies 1a and 1b to measure affective 
maintenance, brightness maintenance, and AF so that the relationships among these constructs 
could be examined. Participants completed two one-hour testing sessions, scheduled one week 
apart. The task order used in the prior studies was adjusted in Study 2 to ensure that all 
assessments could be completed within the one-hour per session design (see Figure 2-1). All 
tasks were performed on a PC desktop computer with E-Prime (Version 2.0.10, 2013), and are 
described, in turn, below.  
Brightness Maintenance Task. In order to maximize efficiency of the brightness 
maintenance task, we first identified and selected pairs that were most discriminative of 
brightness maintenance ability. While all pairs previously included in the brightness maintenance 
task were originally rated as low arousal with intermediate valence (Pilot Study C; Mikels et al., 
2008), an additional assessment made by two independent raters excluded appetitive stimuli (e.g. 
food or drink) and potentially non-neutral content (e.g. lava or lightening). From the remaining 
46 pairs, we used an IRT analysis of the data from Study 1b to identify the 28 pairs with the 
highest discrimination scores, which were presumably the most sensitive to maintenance ability 
(See Appendix 2C for full method on IRT analyses). Apart from the number of trials, the 
brightness maintenance task was the same as Study 1b. 
Brightness Intensity Ratings. Immediately after the maintenance task in the first 
session, participants viewed all images from this task again and rated their brightness “intensity” 
or overall magnitude of perceived illumination for each image individually. Due to a 
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programming error, one pair presented during the brightness maintenance task failed to be 
presented during the rating task, preventing us from scoring this trial. Thus, this pair was 
dropped when calculating the overall accuracy scores and only performance from the completed 
27 pairs was used. 
Affective Forecasting. As in the previous studies, during the first session, participants 
read descriptions of emotional images and were asked to predict how they would feel if they 
were to view each image (i.e., Phase I). Then, during the second session a week later, 
participants saw the images and rated how they actually felt using the same scale (i.e., Phase II). 
The descriptions, images, protocol, and scoring procedure were identical to those used in Studies 
1a and 1b. 
Affect Maintenance Task. In an effort to maximize efficiency of the affect maintenance 
task, we identified and selected the pairs that were most diagnostic of AWM ability. Using an 
Item-Response Theory (IRT) analysis, we selected 56 pairs from those used in Study 1a (see 
Appendix 2C for details). We chose the 28 most discriminative positive pairs and the 28 most 
discriminative negative pairs using the data from Study 1a. This yielded the subset of pairs that 
were the most diagnostic of AWM ability for each valence. All pairs for the affect maintenance 
task were viewed during the second session. Parameters of the task, except for the number of 
pairs, remained identical to Study 1a. 
Emotional Intensity Ratings. Immediately after the affect maintenance task in Session 
2, participants viewed each image from the affect maintenance task again individually and rated 
the “intensity” or overall magnitude of emotional reaction for each. The design of this task was 
the same as Study 1a. 
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Additional Measures 
Similar to Studies 1a and 1b, participants completed the VVIQ (Marks, 1973), STEU 
(MacCann & Roberts, 2008), and AES (Schutte et al., 1998) during the first session. Participants 
also performed the PANAS (Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988) at the beginning and end of both 
sessions to ensure their emotional states were not negatively influenced by the images viewed in 
the study. For exploratory reasons we included a gambling task adapted from De Martino et al. 
(2006; see Mikels & Reed, 2009), which was administered at the very end of Session 1 and will 
not be discussed.  
Maintenance Task Scoring 
Affect and Brightness Maintenance Accuracy Scores. The accuracy for each task was 
determined using the individualized scoring procedure described for Studies 1a and 1b. As 
mentioned above, five participants were excluded from all analyses because they performed 
more than two standard deviations below the mean on at least one of the maintenance tasks (i.e., 
two participants met this criterion for the affect maintenance task and three for the brightness 
maintenance task).  
Results 
 Descriptive statistics for affective forecasting (AF), affect maintenance and brightness 
maintenance task performance, and vividness of visual imagery (VVIQ) are presented in Table 
2-1. As the means indicate, brightness maintenance accuracy (M = .85, SD = .08) was slightly 
but significantly better than affect maintenance accuracy (M = .81, SD = .09; p < .05), a 
difference that is likely due to pair selection, as we address further below. Because linear 
regression accounts for predictor variables with different means, we proceeded with our planned 
tests. Additionally, AF performance was consistent with the previous results. 
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A multiple linear regression was computed with AF accuracy as the outcome variable and 
affect maintenance accuracy, brightness maintenance accuracy, and VVIQ scores as predictors. 
Results indicated that this model was significant (F(3,92) = 5.37, p = .002) with an R2 = .15. As 
predicted, affect maintenance performance contributed significantly to the model ( = 0.33, p = 
.001) whereas brightness maintenance performance did not ( = 0.16, p = .103; see Figure 2-5). 
VVIQ scores did not contribute to the model,  = 0.01, p = .89. In order to examine the 
relationships between performance on each maintenance task and AF while holding the other 
constant, we ran partial correlations. The partial correlation between AF and affect maintenance 
controlling for brightness maintenance was significant ( = .34, p <. 001), whereas the partial 
correlation between AF and brightness maintenance controlling for affect maintenance was not 
significant ( = .17, p = .101). Additionally, no relationship between performance on the 
brightness maintenance and affect maintenance tasks was found, r(94) = .12, p = .252.  
 
 
Figure 2-5. Scatterplots showing forecasting accuracy plotted as a function of maintenance task 
performance in Study 2. The graphs (with best-fitting regression line and shaded region 
indicating 95% confidence interval) show that Affect Maintenance Accuracy (left) but not 
Brightness Maintenance Accuracy (right) predicts AF Ability using a within-subject design 
(Study 2). 
 = 0.33  
p = .001 
 = 0.16 
p = .103 
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Ancillary Analyses 
Using Pearson’s r correlation coefficients, the relationships between AF and EI were 
assessed and no significant relationships between AF and either type of EI (trait: r(93) = .09, p = 
.383; ability: r(94) = .18, p = .076) were found (see Table 2-2 for EI scores). Affect maintenance 
accuracy was not related to trait EI (r(93) = –.07, p = .521) but there was a significant 
relationship between affect maintenance accuracy and ability EI, r(94) = .31, p = .002. 
Brightness maintenance accuracy performance was not related to trait EI (r(93) = –.08, p = .452) 
nor ability EI, r(94) = .02, p = .857.  
Studies 1 & 2 Combined Results from the Additional Measures 
To determine whether previously reported findings of a positive association between EI 
and AF replicated, we included measures of trait and ability EI in all current studies. Although 
no significant relationships were found between EI and AF in each study separately (.04 ≤ rs ≤ 
.18; all ps ≥ .08), we combined the data sets to create a larger sample (N = 230 participants) and 
repeated the correlations with increased power. AF was not significantly related to either type of 
EI (trait: r(225) = .10, p = .14; ability: r(228) = .11, p = .11). Thus, no overall relationships were 
found between AF and either type of EI. Additionally, there was no significant overall 
relationship between VVIQ and AF such that self-reported visual imagery ability was not related 
to forecasting accuracy, r(228) = –.03, p =.692. 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 2 replicate and extend the findings from Studies 1a and 1b by 
demonstrating that emotion maintenance ability predicts AF accuracy whereas brightness 
maintenance does not. Further, the analyses of the combined data from the three participant 
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samples collected thus far provide no evidence that either measure of EI or visual imagery are 
related to AF.  
Study 3 aimed to build on these results and take the effects a step further, replicating and 
extending the selective association between affect maintenance and AF using methods and 
analyses that have been pre-registered. This next study also included two additional, more widely 
used measures of visual working memory. Due to their non-affective nature, we expected them 
to be unrelated to AF, which would provide further evidence for specificity and strengthen the 
argument that working memory for emotion plays a unique role in AF. Accordingly, we 
hypothesized that affect maintenance performance would be a significant predictor of AF ability 
whereas performance on the brightness maintenance and other cognitive working memory tasks 
would not be.    
Because of the difference in accuracy between affect and brightness maintenance in 
Study 2, in Study 3 we made several stimulus substitutions to better equate accuracy on two 
maintenance tasks. Of note, this unexpected accuracy difference in Study 2 is unlikely to have 
caused the selective association we observed between affect maintenance and AF, because linear 
regression accounts for predictor variables with different means. 
Additionally, because the relationships between AF and EI were found to be unreliable in 
the prior studies, we opted not to include EI measures in Study 3. Instead, for exploratory 
purposes, we included a measure of emotion regulation (ER; Gross, 2013). Participants self-
reported the tendency to regulate their emotions using (a) cognitive reappraisal, which refers to 
changing how one appraises internal or external situations in an effort to modify the emotional 
significance, and (b) expressive suppression, which refers to the inhibition of emotional 
expression (Gross, 2013). As previously described, Mikels et al. (2008) found that performance 
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was impaired on the affect maintenance task while participants were performing a concurrent ER 
(cognitive reappraisal) task. This interference may be indicative of a shared underlying process. 
Therefore, we predicted a positive relationship between AWM and ER, specifically cognitive 
reappraisal.  
Study 3: Replicating and Extending the Selective AWM-AF Association 
Method 
Participants 
A new sample of ninety-six young adults participated in exchange for course credit or 
payment. Five participants failed to follow instructions or complete the study and six were 
excluded due to poor performance on the maintenance tasks (see below for details). Thus, the 
reported analyses were performed on data from eighty-five participants (72.6% female, mean age 
18.7 (SD = 0.90), 70.0% white), who were self-reported right-handers and native English 
speakers. A power analysis based on Study 2 indicated that, in order to detect a medium-large 
effect with five predictors and 80% power at the traditional alpha = .05 criterion of statistical 
significance, we needed at least 79 participants (G*Power 3.1). We over-recruited for anticipated 
attrition and low-performing individuals. All experimental procedures were approved by the 
University of Michigan Institutional Review Board. The methods and analyses were pre-
registered and can be found at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=q6x38e (note: revised version 
available here http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=hp6zi4).  
Design and Procedures 
Similar to Study 2, all participants completed two one-hour testing sessions scheduled one week 
apart that included the affect maintenance, brightness maintenance and AF tasks (see Figure 2-
1). Additionally, participants performed two visual working memory tasks, split between weeks 
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to minimize mental fatigue (Session 1: Corsi Block-Tapping; Session 2: Visual Change 
Detection). All tasks were performed on a PC desktop computer with E-Prime (Version 2.0.10, 
2013), and are described, in turn, below.  
Maintenance Tasks. In Study 3 we made several substitutions to the stimulus set in an 
effort to better equate overall performance on the two maintenance tasks. Our prior approach was 
to select the top-most discriminative pairs for the affect and brightness tasks respectively (see 
Appendix 2C). Consequently, the brightness pairs were inadvertently more discriminative than 
the affect pairs. For Study 3, we selected again the most discriminative pairs for each domain, 
with the constraint that the average discrimination index across the pairs for each task would be 
statistically equivalent. This led to a change in 21 brightness pairs and 11 affect pairs. In all 
respects, the task parameters remained identical to Study 2. 
Rating Tasks. Participants performed the corresponding rating task after each 
maintenance task. For emotional intensity ratings, participants viewed all images from the affect 
maintenance task again individually and rated the “intensity”, or overall magnitude of emotional 
reaction for each. For the brightness ratings, participants viewed all images from the brightness 
maintenance task again individually and rated the perceived “intensity”, or overall magnitude of 
light or illumination of the image. The task design was identical to Studies 1 and 2. 
Affective Forecasting. The AF task was identical to the one previously used in Studies 
1a, 1b, and 2.  
Corsi Block Tapping Task. To assess visuospatial working memory, we employed a 
computerized version of forward and backward Corsi-Block Tapping Task (WMS-R; Wechsler, 
2000). A subset of nine white blocks turn red sequentially on the computer screen in a particular 
sequence. In the task, participants then repeat the sequence by clicking on the squares in the 
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same (forward) or reverse (backward) order. Set size (i.e., sequence length) increases from three 
to nine squares with three trials for each set size. The task is discontinued when the participant 
answers all three trials of a given set size incorrectly. Scores were calculated as the product of 
the largest set size attempted and the total number of correctly reproduced sequences, calculated 
separately for backward and forward versions of the task. These two scores were then 
standardized and averaged to obtain one composite Corsi score.  
Visual Change Detection. A computerized delayed match-to-sample, visual change 
detection task (Luck & Vogel, 1997) served as an additional measure of visual working memory. 
In this task, participants view a sample array of two to ten variously colored squares (500ms). 
The squares then change to reveal variants of a horizontal stripe pattern that includes equal parts 
of the six possible colors the squares can be (500ms). A test probe then appears and participants 
must indicate whether the square in that position is the same color it was in the initial sample 
array. Cowan’s capacity score (K) is calculated using the formula (hit rate + correct rejection rate 
– 1, for each set size) x N, where N is set size (Cowan, 2001; Rouder, Morey, Morey, & Cowan 
2011). To avoid problematic averaging as advised in Rouder et al. (2011), we excluded sub-span 
capacities (i.e., N = 2) and negative K scores were changed to zero before averaging across set 
sizes to create a composite K score for each participant. 
Additional Measures 
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants completed the VVIQ (Marks, 1973). The Positive Affect 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) was again administered before and after each session to 
ensure mood was not negatively affected by the study and was not analyzed further (Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Additionally, at the end of Session 1, participants completed a self-
report measure of emotion regulation strategies, described next. 
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Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). To explore potential relationships between 
emotion regulation, AWM, and AF, participants completed the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ measures the tendency of participants to 
regulate their emotions using Cognitive Reappraisal and Expressive Suppression, two ER 
strategies. Participants read ten statements regarding how individuals regulate and manage their 
emotions and rated the extent to which they agreed with each one on a scale from strongly 
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Scores for Cognitive Reappraisal (6-items) and Expressive 
Suppression (4-items) were calculated by following the standard procedure of averaging the 
items in each category.  
Maintenance Tasks Scoring 
Affect and Brightness Maintenance Accuracy Scores. The accuracy for each task was 
determined using the individualized scoring procedure described for Studies 1 and 2. As 
mentioned above, six participants were excluded from all analysis due to performing two or 
more standard deviations below the mean on affective or brightness maintenance tasks. These 
scores were approximately 50% accuracy, indicating chance-level performance. 
Results and Discussion 
 Descriptive statistics for AF, affective maintenance, brightness maintenance, and the 
VVIQ are provided in Table 2-1.  The means make evident that performance on the two 
maintenance tasks is well matched, and AF performance continued to be relatively stable in this 
fourth population.  
We first examined the correlations among the visual working memory tasks. Brightness 
maintenance performance did not correlate significantly with change detection performance, 
r(82) = 0.13, p = .222, and the relationship with Corsi performance was only a trend, r(83) = 
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0.19, p = .077. In contrast, performance on the Corsi and change detection tasks were 
significantly related, r(82) = 0.29, p = .008. These results suggest that the brightness 
maintenance task measures an ability that is dissimilar from that measured by these two 
conventional measures of visual working memory. Affect maintenance accuracy did not correlate 
with either Corsi (r(83) = .009, p = .932) or change detection performance, r(82) = –.002, p = 
.986. As in Study 2, brightness maintenance accuracy and affect maintenance accuracy were 
unrelated, r(83) = 0.12, p = 0.258.  
A multiple linear regression was then computed with AF as the outcome variable and 
performance on affect maintenance, brightness maintenance, Corsi, change detection, and VVIQ 
as predictors. The model was significant (F(5, 78) = 2.69, p = .027) with an R2 = .15. Affect 
maintenance accuracy contributed significantly to the model, predicting AF ability ( = 0.25, p = 
.022), while brightness maintenance did not ( = –.03, p = .802; see Figure 2-6). VVIQ scores 
also contributed significantly, such that greater imaging abilities indicated greater AF accuracy 
( = –.21, p = .047). Additionally, performance on the visual change detection task ( = –.22, p = 
.049) was also a significant (negative) predictor of AF performance, such that higher capacity 
scores were predictive of less accurate forecasts. Performance on the Corsi was not a significant 
predictor of AF,  = .13, p = .226. 
The unexpected negative association between change detection performance and AF 
ability in the multiple linear regression led us to further examine the change detection predictor 
variable. While a multiple linear regression calculates the variance explained by each predictor 
holding the other predictors constant, this is only possible when the predictors in the model are 
orthogonal, or unrelated, to one another (Kutner, Nachtscheim, Neter & Li, 2005). Therefore, 
correlations greater than zero between predictor variables make it impossible to determine the 
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true unique effect of each predictor on the outcome variable due to multicollinearity, even when 
the simple correlations between predictors are relatively small (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 
2003). Thus, the significant correlation between Corsi and change detection performance may 
contribute to this unexpected effect.  
To assess the relationship between AF ability and change detection without other 
predictors, we performed a zero-order correlation and the results were not significant, r(82) = –
.19, p = .088. Because of the difference in predictive value with and without the presence of 
other variables, it may be that the Corsi, or another variable, acted as a moderator on the 
relationship between change detection and AF, increasing the effect in its presence (Cohen et al., 
2003). Nevertheless, these findings suggest that the change detection variable only predicts AF 
ability when included in a model with other variables and may not uniquely contribute to AF 
ability as originally revealed in the regression. 
Further support that affect maintenance is uniquely related to AF comes from partial 
correlations. The relationship between AF and affect maintenance controlling for brightness 
maintenance was significant ( = .23, p =. 036), whereas the relationship between AF and 
brightness maintenance controlling for affect maintenance was not ( = –.03, p = .789). The 
relationship between AF and affect maintenance also remained significant while controlling for 




Figure 2-6. Scatterplots showing forecasting accuracy plotted as a function of maintenance task 
performance in Study 3. The graphs (with best-fitting regression line and shaded region 
indicating 95% confidence interval) show that Affect Maintenance Accuracy (left) but not 
Brightness Maintenance Accuracy (right) predicts AF Ability, replicating the findings from 
Studies 1 and 2. 
Exploratory Analyses  
 To determine whether use of ER strategies were related to AF and affect maintenance 
performance, Pearson’s r correlation coefficients were computed. AF was significantly related to 
use of cognitive reappraisal (r(83) = 0.29, p = 0.007) but not expressive suppression (r(83) = 
.021, p = .845). Affect maintenance was not significantly related to cognitive reappraisal (r(83) = 
.06, p = .601) nor expressive suppression, r(83) = .09, p = .422. 
General Discussion 
These studies tested the hypothesis that AWM contributes to the ability to make accurate 
forecasts about future feelings. Across three independent samples of participants, performance 
on an affect maintenance task reliably and consistently predicted AF performance, supporting 
this hypothesis. Furthermore, three studies also demonstrated that working memory for 
brightness intensity was not predictive of AF, suggesting that working memory for emotion 
intensity plays a unique role in AF. We consider the implications of these results and several 
 = 0.25  
p = .022 
 = –.03 
p = .802 
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other findings for understanding the processes that underlie AF, as well as the implications for 
AWM and its role in mental processes more generally. We also consider the finding that EI was 
not related to AF or AWM. Finally, we discuss several limitations of the present investigations 
and potential ways to address them. 
Implications for Affective Forecasting 
We posit that the selective relationship we observed between AWM and AF is due to the 
specific processes needed to hold in mind and reflect on emotional experiences. This 
interpretation is supported by the finding that the ability to maintain intensity information about a 
non-affective subjective state, i.e., brightness, had no bearing on AF ability. Our hypothesis that 
AWM plays an important role in AF is based on the idea that predicting future feeling states 
involves conjuring up, working with, and comparing emotional experiences—all processes 
hypothesized to require AWM (Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2013, 2019; Smith & Lane, 2015). Our 
results support this hypothesis by demonstrating that individuals who are better able to hold an 
emotional feeling in mind for subsequent comparison, are better able to predict the intensity of 
their future feelings. 
We included a measure of visual imagery in all studies because a potential strategy for 
completing the current AF task is to create a visual image of the verbally described emotional 
scene. It seemed plausible then that people with better and more vivid imagery would perform 
better on the AF task. Instead, we found that performance on the VVIQ was an inconsistent 
predictor of AF performance across studies. Combining the data from all four studies revealed no 
overall relationship between the VVIQ and AF performance (r(313) = –.06, p = .223), indicating 
that imagery ability does not facilitate forecasting accuracy at least using these particular 
measures. Alternatively, the verbal description on each AF trial may be processed directly to 
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evoke the emotional feelings that are then rated for intensity, without the need to generate an 
image. 
For exploratory purposes, the last study included a measure of ER. Whereas the 
hypothesized relationship with AWM was not evident, people reporting more frequent use of 
cognitive reappraisal also turned out to be better forecasters. This is an interesting and novel 
result that requires replication. Nevertheless, the relationship suggests an interaction between 
forecasting and regulation processes. This is consistent with a proposal by Loewenstein (2007), 
who posited that participants select ER strategies based on their forecasted effectiveness and that 
ER success is dependent on the accuracy of these forecasts. Additionally, Ringnes, Stalsett, 
Hegstad, & Danbolt (2017) discovered that some individuals use prospects of future emotions to 
regulate their current affective states, an ER strategy they called “emotional forecasting.” While 
the extant findings provide converging evidence for an ER-AF interaction, subsequent research 
should examine how individuals use their forecasts to inform regulation strategies and vice versa.  
Visual working memory did not predict AF performance when measured by the 
brightness maintenance task across all studies, nor did Corsi Block performance in Study 3. The 
relationship between AF and change detection is less clear. Better change detection performance 
was associated with worse forecasting ability in a multiple linear regression but not in an 
independent correlation. If change detection and AF performance are truly related, it may be that 
people with lower visual working memory capacities rely on different, more effective, strategies 
to forecast their feelings. However, given that this relationship was anomalous among the 
measures of visual working memory used here, and that the negative association between change 
detection and AF was only significant in presence of other predictors likely reflecting either a 
moderating effect or collinearity, we are hesitant to conclude that the regression results reflect a 
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true association. Future research using these measures will be needed to resolve these 
uncertainties. 
Implications for Affective Working Memory 
The present results indicating that AF is related to affective but not brightness 
maintenance also provide additional support for the idea that AWM is a separable, domain-
specific subsystem of working memory. These results complement and extend prior evidence for 
separability of affect and brightness maintenance processes based on selective interference 
methodology, age differences, and special patient populations (Mikels et al., 2008; Mikels et al., 
2005, 2012; Gard et al., 2011). Working memory is known to be a fundamental capacity that is 
integral to higher-order cognition. The present evidence that AWM supports AF ability suggests 
AWM may play a comparable role as a crucial facet of higher-order emotion-related mentation. 
The relationship we found between AWM and AF has practical implications as well. 
Previous reports suggest that AF may be improved by interventions. For example, by having 
participants think about multiple past experiences (Buehler & McFarland, 2001) or several 
features of the target outcome/event when making forecasts (Lam, Buehler, & McFarland, 2005), 
predictions are less likely to be extreme. The present findings that AWM ability contributes to 
individual variability in AF suggest that improving AWM could potentially enhance forecasting 
abilities. Training can improve working memory performance in the cognitive domain (e.g., 
Soveri, Antfolk, Karlsson, Salo, & Lane, 2017; see also Redick, 2019), and there are indications 
that the same may be true in the affective domain (e.g., de Voogd, Wiers, Zwitser, & Salemink, 
2016). Thus, future work aimed at training AWM could include measures to assess possible 
benefits to affective forecasting as well. 
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We also hypothesized AWM and emotion regulation, namely cognitive reappraisal, may 
share an underlying mechanism due to impaired performance on the affect maintenance task 
when performing a concurrent cognitive reappraisal task (Mikels et al., 2005; see also Gard et 
al., 2011). Contrary to our hypothesis, no significant relationship was found between 
performance on affect maintenance and the self-reported tendency to use cognitive reappraisal. 
Because the results across the three present studies demonstrate that AWM is predictive of AF 
ability, and AF ability was found to be related to cognitive reappraisal, it is possible the 
relationship between AWM and emotion regulation is not direct. Future research should 
investigate the possible role that AWM may play in cognitive reappraisal and how it may 
influence ER or other types of higher order emotional processing. Additionally, while a self-
report measure for ER is convenient, it may be more informative to examine differences in 
performance-based cognitive reappraisal success between individuals to determine direct 
associations. 
Relations with Emotional Intelligence 
We included EI measures in the current study to reassess the relationships between AF 
and EI, and to explore the potential relationship between AWM and EI. Across the current 
studies, we found no evidence for relationships between AF and either trait or ability EI. These 
results are inconsistent with previous reports that AF is significantly related to ability EI (Dunn 
et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012) and trait EI (Hoerger et al., 2012). Methodological differences 
among these studies may contribute to these discrepant results. For both constructs, Dunn et al. 
(2007) used measures different from those used in the present investigation, measuring AF by 
comparing predicted and actual reactions to real events (e.g., elections or college sporting events) 
and measuring ability EI using a composite and emotion management sub-score from the Mayer-
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Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002a). 
These differed from the present verbal-description-based measure of AF and the Situational Test 
of Emotional Understanding, which focuses on the understanding emotion component, rather 
than the managing emotion component of EI. Nevertheless, even using a similar AF measure and 
identical EI task, we were unable to replicate the Hoerger et al. results (2012). This discrepancy 
may stem from other prominent differences in study designs. In Hoerger et al. (2012) participants 
completed the entirety of the AF task online, rather than in-person. Moreover, in Hoerger et al. 
(Study 2; 2012) participants performed the feelings rating portion of the AF task immediately 
after the prediction rating with an average delay period of only three minutes, and both used a 9-
point rating scale. With this brief intervening interval, memory of prior numerical ratings could 
influence the assessments and ratings of actual feeling states. In contrast, our participants used a 
visual analog scale for the rating tasks and had a one-week interval between Phase I (i.e., 
prediction rating) and Phase II (i.e., experienced feelings rating), design features that are likely to 
mitigate reliance on memory for the original predictions. These inconsistent findings suggest the 
need for additional research to understand the relationship between AF and EI.  
Moreover, we failed to find associations between EI and AWM. If AWM constitutes a 
fundamental emotion processing capacity, then one would expect it to be related to both superior 
EI and more successful AF. However, we found that AWM was unrelated to trait or ability EI. 
The failure to find relationships between AWM and EI despite finding a consistent relationship 
between AWM and AF may be due to the differences in the way the constructs were assessed. 
The measures for AWM and AF were both task-based and used the participants’ own responses 
to determine accuracy. In contrast, both measures of EI are not task-based and accuracy for 
ability EI using the STEU is determined using Roseman’s Appraisal Theory (MacCann & 
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Roberts, 2008). Future research that tests these associations using another measure such as the 
MSCEIT, which calculates accuracy using consensus or expert scoring (Mayer et al., 2002a), 
would allow us to further investigate the generality of these findings.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our study had several limitations that should be addressed in future work. We observed a 
strong and consistent relationship between AF and AWM. Yet, this association is based on a 
single measure of AF ability that uses predicted intensity ratings of text describing emotional 
scenes. While this measure has been used in several prior investigations of AF, an important 
future direction is to establish that the association we have documented between AWM and AF 
is generalizable to measures of AF with greater ecological validity. Future studies should 
investigate this relationship using forecasted feelings for real-life events, which are more likely 
to approximate the use of AF in everyday life. Our measure of AF was also limited to ratings of 
anticipated emotional intensity, which aligns well with our intensity-based measure of AWM. A 
recent model of AF proposed that other aspects of predictions about ones’ future feelings, such 
as the effect of an event on ones’ mood, may be more biased, or error prone, than intensity 
(Lench et al., 2019). We expect that AWM would play a role in these estimates as well, however 
this remains to be explored. 
Other potential limitations are due to the size and age restrictions of our sample. We 
acknowledge that our sample sizes in each of the four studies were moderate due to practical 
limitations of in-person laboratory testing. However, our sample sizes were determined by a 
priori power analyses and are typical compared to other studies using in-person measures of AF 
(see Buehler & MacFarland, 2001; Dunn et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 1998). In general, in-person 
testing adds experimental control, consistency, and retention advantages that are less 
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characteristic of internet testing, but also place practical limitations on sample size. Developing 
an internet version in the future for more wide-spread use of the task would permit a larger and 
more diverse sample. Additionally, because of age-related effects on emotional processing 
(Mather, 2016; Mikels et al., 2005), our results may not generalize to other age groups, 
especially older adults. Given the role of AF in decision making (Loewenstein, 2007; Mellers & 
McGraw, 2001) and the life-altering financial and healthcare decisions faced by older adults, 
future studies should take a life-span developmental approach to determine if and when the 
relationship between AWM and AF changes. 
Finally, a potential caveat concerns the concurrent validity of the brightness maintenance 
task. The demands of the brightness maintenance task were well-suited to juxtapose the affect 
maintenance task, where the emotional intensity attribute is held in working memory. However, 
brightness maintenance was only weakly and non-significantly related to Corsi and change 
detection performance. The limited associations between brightness maintenance and these two 
canonical visual working memory tasks could reflect that the brightness maintenance task 
measures the ability to accurately retain an attribute of a visual image, namely intensity, rather 
than quantities or sequences of visual features (e.g., colors or locations). Thus, while the 
concurrent validity of the brightness maintenance task remains to be further clarified, affect and 
brightness maintenance abilities do appear separable (as evidenced by their lack of correlation 
and the selective relationship between AF and maintenance of emotional, but not brightness, 
intensity). Furthermore, the relationship between affect maintenance and AF remained 
unaffected when controlling for brightness maintenance and either of the two canonical measures 
of visual working memory. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, despite considerable extant research on AF, the contributions of an 
elemental system such as AWM have not been previously considered. The present results 
indicate that unlike other measures of working memory, affect maintenance ability reliably 
predicts AF ability. We conclude that AWM is a core ability that supports affective prospection, 
and may also underlie other forms of higher-order emotional thought. For example, AWM may 
provide the mental work space for episodic counterfactual thinking about past emotional 
experiences (De Brigard & Parikh, 2019), or other forms of mental simulation where feeling 
states play a prominent role. The present work suggests that individual differences in AWM 
ability may be important to the quality and accuracy of emotion-related thought. 
Context 
Affective working memory (AWM) is a putative core mental ability for higher-order 
emotion-related thought. Because affective forecasting (AF) involves judgements about feelings 
that are generated, actively maintained in mind and evaluated, processes that we and others 
attribute AWM, we hypothesized that AWM ability would contribute to the accuracy of affective 
forecasts. That is, if someone is better able to conjure and hold emotional feeling states in mind, 
they would be more accurate in reflecting on and predicting their future feelings. While much of 
the affective forecasting literature focuses on errors due to bias, our work focuses on individual 
differences due to working memory abilities. The current findings support the hypothesis that 
AWM plays a unique role in AF ability adding credence to the proposal that AWM contributes to 
higher-order emotional thought. In future work, we plan to assess this relationship further using 
other forecasting tasks, and extend this research to older adults to determine how the AWM-AF 
relationship changes with age.   
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 The Role of Affective Working Memory in Real-World Affective                      
Forecasting Accuracy (Study 4) 
Choice is a fundamental part of life—Should I ride my bike to work today? Should I take 
that new job across the country? Should I splurge on a fancy television? And a crucial aspect of 
making good decisions is predicting how different outcomes will make us feel (Mellers, 
Schwartz, & Ritov 1999; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Charpentier et al., 2016). However, this 
form of prospection, known as affective forecasting (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003), is an ability that 
varies greatly amongst individuals. A recent investigation sought to explain variability in 
affective forecasting and found that affective working memory—a distinct domain of working 
memory responsible for actively maintaining and working with feeling states—predicted 
individual differences in forecasting accuracy (Frank et al., 2021). In the present study, we tested 
whether this relationship between the ability to maintain emotional experiences and forecasting 
accuracy, previously tested in the laboratory, generalized to forecasted feelings to a major real-
world event (i.e., 2020 United States presidential election) in a broad sample of participants 
recruited via the internet. This work aimed to expound the unique role affective working memory 
plays in emotional prospection. 
Affective working memory, also called working memory for emotion, refers to the ability 
to actively hold feeling states in mind (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Mikels et al., 2005; 2008; 
Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2019). Just as cognitive working memory supports the maintenance of 
mental representations of perceptual or verbal information, affective working memory 
constitutes a distinct working memory domain responsible for the maintenance of emotion 
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representations where feelings themselves are the memoranda (Mikels et al., 2008; Mikels & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2019). Affective working memory is typically measured using an emotion 
maintenance (also called affect maintenance) task, where participants hold feelings evoked by an 
emotional image in mind over a delay before deciding if the feelings were more or less intense 
than feelings elicited by a second image (Mikels et al., 2005; 2008; Broome et al., 2012). 
Although separable from other working memory domains, affective working memory also 
reflects an active, rather than passive, maintenance process (Waugh, Lemus, & Gotlib, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2017, DeFraine, 2016), and has been posited to support goal-directed behavior 
across several higher-order emotion-related abilities (e.g., emotion regulation, wisdom, 
rumination; Mikels & Reuter-Lorenz, 2019). Most recently, affective working memory was 
found to explain variability in the accuracy of forecasted feelings (Frank et al., 2021). 
According to decision affect theory, we use predictions of future feelings (i.e., affective 
forecasting) to guide our choices (Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Mellers & McGraw, 2001). 
Several studies have found that incorporating anticipated emotions into decision-making models 
better predicted choice, underscoring the idea that affective forecasting is an important part of 
how we make decisions (Mellers et al., 1999; Ahn et al., 2012; Charpentier et al., 2016; Hayes & 
Wedell, 2020). Yet, we are not all that accurate in these predictions, often overestimating the 
intensity and duration of our feelings (i.e., impact bias; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; 2013; but see 
Levine et al., 2019), which may lead to suboptimal decision making (Kermer et al., 2006; 
Loewenstein, 2005). Inaccurate prospection, including affective predictions, has also been 
associated with negative mental health and well-being outcomes (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; 
MacLeod, 2016; Roepke & Seligman, 2016). Although this ability to make accurate predictions 
of future feelings varies greatly among individuals, the reasons for this variability are poorly 
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understood. Some previous studies have proposed that individual differences in forecasting 
accuracy may be related to personality traits (Hoerger et al., 2016) or emotional intelligence 
(Dunn et al, 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012; but see Frank et al., 2021). Alternatively, in a recent 
study, Frank et al. (2021) found that variability in forecasting accuracy may also be explained by 
working memory for emotion—i.e., affective working memory. Because affective forecasting 
requires conjuring up and maintaining emotional experiences for evaluation, the authors 
hypothesized that individuals who are better able to maintain feeling states (i.e., better affective 
working memory), would be more accurate in predicting their future feelings. Across a series of 
three laboratory-based studies, emotion, but not perceptual, maintenance abilities predicted 
forecasting accuracy, revealing a unique role for affective working memory in the accuracy of 
anticipating future feelings (Frank et al., 2021).   
The measure of affective forecasting accuracy used by Frank et al. (2021), employed 
previously by Hoerger et al. (2012), was a description-based task that compared predicted and 
actual feelings elicited by emotionally evocative photographs. If affective working memory plays 
a unique and fundamental role in emotional prospection, then individual differences in this type 
of working memory should also predict the accuracy of forecasts about real-life events. The 
present study tested this hypothesis using a major real-world event: the 2020 United States 
presidential election. Further, this study included a replication of the description-based 
forecasting task where the data were obtained from a broad internet-based participant sample. As 
hypothesized, we report that emotion, but not perceptual, maintenance abilities predict individual 





A total of 114 participants were recruited––110 from Prolific, an online recruitment 
platform, and four1 from the University Introductory Psychology Subject Pool. Ninety-four of 
these participants returned to complete Session 2, and 86 completed Session 3. Following a priori 
exclusion criteria, ten outliers were removed for poor performance (see Design and Procedure for 
details). Thus, the final sample included 76 participants—73 from Prolific and three from 
Subject Pool2. These 76 participants (aged 18-29, mean age = 23.6, 51.3% female, 56.6% 
students) were self-reported right-handed, English-speakers. Because our key measure 
incorporates the outcome of the United States (U.S.) presidential election, only U.S. citizens 
were recruited. We aimed to obtain a sample size of at least N = 85 to match previous studies that 
used a priori power analyses to examine similar measures of interest (Frank et al., 2021). 
Although this was ultimately not possible due to high rates of attrition, our actual sample of 76 
participants led to the observed power (1 – 𝛽) of 0.72 and 0.73 for each model, which was 
sufficient for detecting small to medium effects (Cohen’s f = .123 and .135; Prajapati, Dunne & 
Armstrong, 2010)3. All experimental procedures were approved by the University of Michigan 




1 Due to a rise in Covid-19 cases on campus, a stay-at-home order for undergraduate students was issued just two 
days before data collection began, which likely contributed to the few number of Subject Pool participants. 
2 Too few participants were recruited from Subject Pool to make between-samples comparisons, however, our 
findings hold whether or not these three participants are included. 
3 Issues regarding the sample size are further addressed in the discussion. 
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Design and Procedure 
Participants completed three testing sessions spanning a three-week period (see Figure 3-
1). In Session 1, participants completed the brightness maintenance and brightness intensity 
rating tasks, and Phase I of the description-based forecasting measure. In Session 2, one-week 
later, participants completed Phase II of the description-based measure, the emotion maintenance 
and emotion intensity rating tasks, and Phase I of the election outcome forecasting measure. 
During Session 3, participants completed Phase II of the election outcome forecasting task. 
Session 3 took place two weeks after Session 2, approximately ten days after the election, and six 
days after the election was called by official sources. The maintenance task order and 
description-based forecasting delay was intended to match Frank et al. (2021). The timing and 
lag used for the election outcome was informed by previous studies that used periods ranging 
from a few days to more than a month before and after the election (Meyvis, Ratner, & Levav, 
2010; Emmanuel et al., 2010; Lench et al., 2019). Maintenance and rating tasks were created in 
PsychoPy (Version 2020.1.2; Peirce et al., 2019) and hosted via Pavlovia. Forecasting measures 
were created and completed on Qualtrics. Participants completed the three study sessions online 
using their own personal computers. During sessions 1 and 3, participants also completed a novel 
measure of forecasting using real-life events, which will not be discussed further (a fuller 
description of this measure and the findings are available in the Appendix 3A). 
 
Figure 3-1. Protocol for Study 4. 
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Emotion Maintenance. Affective working memory was assessed with an emotion 
maintenance task (Figure 3-2; Mikels et al., 2005; 2008; Broome et al., 2012; Frank et al., 2021). 
For each trial, participants viewed one emotional image (5 seconds). After it disappeared, 
participants continued to actively hold the feelings elicited from the photo, at the same intensity 
level (3 seconds). They then viewed another emotional image (5 seconds), before deciding if the 
second image evoked more or less ‘emotional intensity’ (i.e., strength or amount of emotional 
reaction), compared to the first. Participants made their responses using the right (second image 
evoked more intensity) or left (second image evoked less intensity) arrow keys. Each of the 56 
trials consisted of a matched-valence image pair (28 positive, 28 negative), with images taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Pairs 
were the same as in Frank et al. Study 3 (2021), which used an item-response theory (IRT) 
analysis designed to identify pairs that were most discriminative between high and low 
performers, and matched mean accuracy scores with the brightness maintenance task (see Frank 
et al. 2021 Supplemental Method for full details). 
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Figure 3-2. Schematic of maintenance tasks used in Study 4. Participants hold the emotion or 
brightness intensity of one image in mind over a delay, before determining if a second image has 
more or less intensity. Image adapted from “Affective Working Memory: An Integrative 
Psychological Construct” by J. A. Mikels and P. A. Reuter-Lorenz, 2019, Perspectives in 
Psychological Science, 14(4), p. 8. Copyright 2019 by SAGE Publications, also used in Frank et 
al. (2021).  
 
Emotion Intensity Rating. Participants viewed the 112 images from the emotion 
maintenance task again individually. For each image, participants rated the emotion intensity 
(i.e., strength or amount of emotional reaction) elicited from the image using a visual analog 
scale with anchors not at all intense and extremely intense. Participants clicked anywhere along 
the continuous scale (absolute resolution: 21 points) to indicate the degree of emotion intensity 
for the image. These ratings were then used to calculate individualized accuracy scores for the 
emotion maintenance task (see Maintenance Task Scoring). 
Brightness Maintenance. Non-affective maintenance abilities were assessed with a 
brightness maintenance task (Figure 3-1), designed as an emotionally-neutral analogue task 
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requiring intensity maintenance (Mikels et al., 2005; 2008; Broome et al., 2012). For each trial, 
participants viewed one neutral image (5 seconds). After it disappeared, participants continued to 
actively hold the brightness intensity in mind, at the same level (3 seconds). They then viewed a 
second neutral image (5 seconds), before deciding if the second image evoked more or less 
‘brightness intensity’ (i.e., amount of overall light or illumination), compared to the first. 
Participants used the left and right arrow key to make their selection. There were 28 pairs in all 
(56 images) selected by Frank et al. Study 3 (2021).  
Brightness Intensity Rating. Participants viewed the 56 images from the brightness 
maintenance task again individually and rated the brightness intensity of each one on a visual 
analog scale (absolute resolution: 21 points) ranging from not at all intense to extremely intense. 
These ratings were used to calculate individualized accuracy scores for the brightness 
maintenance task (see Maintenance Task Scoring). 
Maintenance Task Scoring. To calculate individualized accuracy scores for the emotion 
maintenance and brightness maintenance tasks, we used the intensity ratings to infer which 
image, when appearing with its pair during the maintenance task, should have been judged as 
evoking more intensity. A trial was scored as correct if there was agreement between the 
intensity ratings and maintenance responses (e.g., second image rated higher during intensity 
rating task and more intense during maintenance task), or incorrect if they were inconsistent 
(e.g., second image rated higher during intensity rating task but less intense during maintenance 
task). Trials in which participants rated both images in a pair as having the same intensity were 
excluded, accounting for 8–9% of trials. We then averaged the scores across all trials, separately 
for each maintenance task, to obtain emotion-maintenance and brightness-maintenance accuracy 
scores between 0 and 1. As described in the pre-registration, we excluded participants who 
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performed > 2 standard deviations below the mean. This resulted in removal of six participants 
for the brightness maintenance task and zero for the emotion maintenance task. 
Description-Based Forecasting. To measure affective forecasting ability as tested 
previously by Frank et al. (2021), we used a description-based measure adapted from Hoerger et 
al. (2012). In Phase I (Session 1), participants read descriptions of ten emotional scenes (five 
positive, five negative) and predicted how they would feel if they were to view each image using 
a visual analog scale ranging from extremely unpleasant to extremely pleasant. In Phase II 
(Session 2), participants viewed each emotionally evocative photograph and rated how they felt 
using the same scale (absolute resolution: 21 points). We then calculated the absolute difference 
between ratings in Phase I and Phase II, averaged across all images, to obtain a forecasting error 
score for each participant. The maximum possible error was 20, with scores > 10 indicating a 
valence reversal (e.g., negative prediction but positive experience). Following the pre-registered 
exclusion criteria, one outlier (forecasting error > 3 SD above the mean) was removed. 
Election Outcome Forecasting. To measure affective forecasting that better captures 
real-life affective predictions, we adapted an event-based forecasting measure (Lench et al., 
2019) to compare predicted and experienced feelings to the outcome of the 2020 U.S. 
presidential election. In Phase I (Session 2), participants read “Suppose it is an evening in 
November and (Joe Biden/Donald Trump) has won the election and will be the next president of 
the United States. How will you be feeling about (Joe Biden/Donald Trump) being president?” 
Participants then rated their predictions of feeling happy, angry, and scared for both candidates 
on a visual analog scale (absolute resolution: 21 points) with anchors not at all 
(happy/angry/scared) and extremely (happy/angry/scared), taken from Lench et al. (2019). In 
Phase II (Session 3), approximately ten days after the election, and six days after the election was 
 74 
called by official sources, participants reported their experienced feelings for the outcome that 
occurred (i.e., Biden victory) using the same three scales. We then calculated the absolute 
discrepancy between ratings in Phase I and Phase II, averaged across the three emotions, 
resulting in a composite forecasting error score (or “forecasting error”) for each participant with 
possible values ranging between 0 and 20. Following the a priori exclusion criteria, one outlier 
was removed (forecasting error > 3 SD above the mean). Additionally, due to computer error, 
data from one participant was not recorded on this measure. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics    
Mean accuracy scores for the emotion maintenance and brightness maintenance tasks, 
and mean forecasting error for the description-based and election outcome measures, are 
provided in Table 3-1. As can be seen from this table, brightness-maintenance accuracy (M = 
.75, SD = .11) was significantly higher than emotion-maintenance accuracy (M = .69, SD = .15, 
t(75) = 3.25, p = .002). Forecasting error on the description-based measure was consistent with 
findings from Frank et al. (2021), and did not differ from election outcome forecasting error, 
t(82) = .92, p =.36.  
Table 3-1. Mean (SD) Performance Across Measures in Study 4 
Measure Mean (SD) 
Emotion-Maintenance Accuracy 0.69 (.15) 
Brightness-Maintenance Accuracy 0.75 (.11) 
Description-Based Forecasting Error 2.59 (1.04) 
Election Outcome Forecasting Error 2.81 (2.22) 
Note: Maintenance task accuracy scores range from 0 and 1; Forecasting error scores range from 0 – 20, with higher 




To test whether maintenance performance predicts forecasting error across the three 
measures, we ran a multivariate linear regression with description-based and election outcome 
forecasting error as the outcome variables and emotion-maintenance and brightness-maintenance 
performance as the predictors. We also included two covariates to control for individual 
variations in the delay between Sessions 1 and 3, and between Sessions 2 and 3, respectively4. 
Following our pre-registered analyses, we also included an exploratory forecasting measure 
using personal life events as a third outcome variable, which yielded null results (this measure 
and findings are described in full in Appendix 3A). 
Emotion-maintenance performance significantly predicted forecasting error on both the 
description-based (𝛽  = –.292, p = .023; Figure 3-3a) and election outcome (𝛽 = –.33, p = .009; 
Figure 3-3b) measures such that better ability to maintain emotions predicted more accurate 
forecasting both in the laboratory and real-life. By comparison, brightness-maintenance 
performance did not predict forecasting variability for either the description-based (𝛽 = –.084, p 
= .503) or election outcome (𝛽 = .177, p = .149) measure. 
Relationship Between Forecasting Measures 
We also examined the association between the description-based and election outcome 
forecasting measures using a Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The association between 
forecasting errors on the description-based and election outcome measures did not reach 








Figure 3-3. Scatterplots showing forecasting error plotted as a function of maintenance task 
performance in Study 4. The graphs (with best-fitting regression line, shaded regions reflecting 
95% confidence intervals, standardized betas and p-values in left-hand corner) reveal that 
emotion maintenance (left) predicts forecasting error on the description-based (A) and election 
outcome (B) measures, whereas brightness maintenance (right) does not. 
 
Valence-Specific Analyses 
To determine whether the relationship between maintenance task performance and 
forecasting accuracy was valence-specific, we conducted additional analyses using only positive 
or only negative trials. Similar to what was found in Frank et al. (2021), no significant 
associations emerged from these analyses, suggesting that the relationship between overall 




































































































































𝛽 = –0.29 
p = 0.02 
𝛽 = –0.08 
p = 0.50 
𝛽 = 0.18 
p = 0.15 
𝛽 = –0.33 
p = 0.01 
B. 
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Direction of Forecasting Bias 
To assess whether participants showed a tendency to overestimate or underestimate their 
future feelings, we also calculated a forecasting bias score (i.e., the raw difference between 
experienced and predicted feelings) for each participant. Based on the scales used here, a positive 
bias score (i.e., greater than zero) would reflect a participant feeling better than expected, that is, 
an overestimation of negative feelings or an underestimation of positive feelings. Accordingly, a 
negative bias score (i.e., less than zero) would reflect a participant feeling worse than expected, 
signifying an underestimation of negative feelings or an overestimation of positive feelings. 
Additionally, because misestimations may be valence-dependent (see Wilson & Gilbert, 2003 for 
a review), we followed the standard practice used in the forecasting literature of assessing bias 
separately for positive and negative outcomes (see Table 3-2). 
For the description-based forecasting measure, we calculated forecasting bias separately 
for positive and negative trials—i.e., the valence of each emotionally evocative image. For 
positive trials, participants significantly overestimated their positive feelings, predicting they 
would feel better than actually experienced (p = .001; see Table 3-2 for results). For negative 
trials, participants overestimated the degree of their negative feelings, expecting to feel worse 
than experienced (p < .0001). 
To assess forecasting bias on the election outcome measure, we categorized participants 
into valence-specific groups based on whether they considered the Biden victory to be a positive 
or negative outcome. Sixty-seven participants were classified based on their reported preferred 
candidate (Biden: Positive outcome, Trump: Negative outcome). We then classified the 
remaining 17 participants who did not select either major-party nominee as their preferred 
candidate into positive or negative outcome groups based on the valence of their predicted 
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feelings of a Biden victory. Participants who saw the Biden victory as a positive outcome did not 
show an overall forecasting bias (p = .683; see Table 3-2). However, those who saw the Biden 
victory as a negative outcome overestimated how negative they would feel (p = .002). This 
pattern remains true if we only include the 67 participants who selected either Biden or Trump as 
their preferred candidate (Biden-supporters, p = .634; Trump-supporters, p =  .044). 
 
Table 3-2. Mean (SD) Forecasting Bias by Valence in Study 4 
Forecasting 
Measure 






Positive 83 –0.93 (2.46) p  = .001; Overestimation 
Negative 83 0.86 (1.52) p < .0001; Overestimation 
Election Outcome 
Positive 66 0.14 (2.80) p = .683; None 
Negative 18 2.67 (3.04) p = .002; Overestimation  
 
Discussion 
The present study provides new evidence that affective working memory is a core ability 
that affects the accuracy with which people can forecast their future feelings. Performance on a 
task requiring active maintenance of emotion intensity predicted individual differences in 
description-based forecasting accuracy in a broader sample of participants aged 18-29, living 
across the United States. In contrast, the ability to maintain brightness intensity did not. This 
selective relationship was further replicated when forecasting feelings about a major real-world 
event (i.e., 2020 U.S. presidential election). We consider the implications of these results for 
affective working memory and affective forecasting, including directions for future research and 
the limitations of this work. 
As hypothesized, better emotion-maintenance performance predicted more accurate 
forecasting using a description-based measure. This result replicates and extends our previous 
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report of a selective positive relationship between affective, but not perceptual or cognitive, 
working memory and forecasting accuracy (Frank et al., 2021). In Frank et al. (2021), 
participants—college students attending a large, public, midwestern university—were tested in 
person in the laboratory. In the present study, young adult participants completed the same 
measures using an online format. Participants in this sample were made up of only 56% students 
and came from 32 states within the U.S. Demonstrating this pattern with on-line testing in a 
broader sample attests to its robustness and generalizability. 
Emotion-maintenance performance also predicted the accuracy of feelings forecasted in 
response to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election, a relationship not previously assessed. 
This result confirms our hypothesis that affective working memory plays an important role in 
forecasting abilities including emotional prospection about highly impactful real-world 
outcomes. In contrast, brightness-maintenance performance did not predict forecasting error in 
either the description-based or election outcome forecasting measures. This result corroborates 
previous findings that brightness maintenance and two other types of perceptual working 
memory did not independently predict variability in the description-based forecasting accuracy 
(Frank et al., 2021). Therefore, it appears that cognitive working memory does not account for 
individual differences in forecasting accuracy, providing further support for a unique role of 
affective working memory in emotional prospection. 
Implications & Future Directions  
These findings advance our understanding of affective working memory in several 
important ways. Affective working memory has been posited to be related to a variety of higher-
order emotion-related mental abilities including emotion regulation, rumination (Mikels & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2013; 2019) and most recently, affective forecasting (Frank et al., 2021). The 
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present evidence reveals a direct association between affective working memory and real-world 
forecasting—an form of prospective thought that is vital to decision making and quality of life. 
These results demonstrate the importance of affective working memory as a fundamental 
psychological process that contributes to higher-order emotional thought. Just as cognitive 
working memory provides the mental workspace for complex cognitive tasks, affective working 
memory provides the mental workspace for mental simulations where feelings play a prominent 
role. Accordingly, affective working memory may support other types of emotional prospection, 
such as counterfactual thinking—or other forms of mental simulation that involve working with 
emotions.  
 These results also have important implications for understanding the psychological 
abilities that contribute to affective forecasting. Existing models of forecasting focus on the 
sources of error and bias (e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Lench et al., 2019) and point to the need 
for interventions aimed at cognitive strategies to overcome these forecasting errors (Buehler & 
McFarland, 2001; Roepke & Seligman, 2016). Our results underscore the important role of 
fundamental psychological abilities, like affective working memory, in forecasting accuracy. 
This idea may lead to updated forecasting models that focus on how our core mental processes 
contribute to the accurate predictions of future feelings. Moreover, to better understand the role 
of working memory for emotion in emotional prospection, future research should work to 
identify which types of forecasting errors are most closely tied to affective working memory. It 
may be the case that affective working memory is strongly related to the projection bias—i.e., 
the tendency for our current affective states to influence our predicted feelings (Loewenstein et 
al. 2001; Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005)—such that those 
with a worse ability to hold both current and predicted emotions in mind are more likely to 
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demonstrate this bias, compared to those with higher affective working memory abilities. On the 
other hand, emotion-maintenance abilities might play a smaller role in errors such as 
misconstrual—i.e., imagining an inaccurate future event (i.e., Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Finding 
the errors in which affective working memory plays the largest role will provide a better 
understanding how individuals forecast their feelings, and allow researchers to create the most 
effective tools for enhancing these abilities.  
Limitations 
One potential limitation of the present study is the overall level of maintenance task 
performance, which was lower than obtained with in-person5 testing (Frank et al. Study 3, 2021). 
We attribute this lower accuracy to online data collection. Participants recruited through online 
platforms have been shown to display lower motivation and/or effort (Chmielewski & Kucker, 
2020; Newman et al., 2021), which may be especially consequential for mentally demanding 
tasks. Nonetheless, even after using more stringent performance cutoffs to eliminate participants 
who may be performing at chance-level (N = 37)6, the novel relationship between emotion 
maintenance and election outcome forecasting accuracy remains significant. This is also the case 
if we exclude participants based on the maintenance task cutoffs obtained from in-person testing 
(Frank et al. Study 3, 2021). Thus, it is unlikely that our present results can be explained by poor 
maintenance task performance. 
 
 
5 Internet-Based Testing Accuracy (current study): Emotion Maintenance: M = 0.69, Brightness Maintenance: M = 
0.75; In-Person Testing Accuracy (Frank et al. Study 3, 2021): Emotion Maintenance: M = 0.80, Brightness 
Maintenance: M = 0.81.  
6 To identify a range of chance performance, we created 95% confidence intervals using parametric bootstrapping 
(10,000 iterations), completed separately for emotion (56 trials) and brightness (28 trials) maintenance tasks. 
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Furthermore, participants performed better on the brightness, compared to the emotion, 
maintenance tasks. We believe the issues with online data collection mentioned previously may 
have been exacerbated by the requirement for participants to focus on their feelings. An 
unwillingness or failure to pay attention to, and therefore maintain, emotional states, will result 
in poorer accuracy scores. However, several prior studies have found discrepancies between 
emotion and brightness maintenance task performance (Mikels et al., 2005, Mikels et al., 2008; 
Broome et al., 2012), and accuracy for both tasks in the current study are still well-within the 
range of previously observed performance. Furthermore, the present findings replicate and 
extend a previously identified relationship that was found when brightness and emotion 
maintenance task performance was both matched (Frank et al. Study 3, 2021) and unmatched 
(Frank et al. Studies 1 & 2, 2021). Therefore, we do not believe differences in performance on 
the maintenance tasks can account for the current findings. 
Additionally, our sample size (N = 76) fell short of our goal (N = 85) by nine participants. 
This was likely a result of high rates of attrition (25%), intensified by the use of online data 
collection, as well as the Covid-19 global pandemic. Moreover, because the study timeline was 
bound to a national event—the 2020 U.S. election—we were unable to add additional 
participants after data collection had begun. Nevertheless, we had sufficient power to detect 
small to medium effects (Description-Based: Cohen’s f = 0.123, Election Outcome: Cohen’s f = 
0.135) that supported our a priori hypotheses that affective working memory is related to the 
ability to predict future feelings. Furthermore, our sample falls within the large range of Ns 
recruited in previous forecasting studies that focused on an election outcome (approximately 60 




In conclusion, we provide novel evidence that affective working memory supports 
forecasting abilities—not only in the laboratory, but in the real-world as well. The present work 
further establishes the importance of affective working memory as a fundamental ability that, 
like other forms of working memory, varies across individuals, and plays a key role in higher-
order psychological processes, such as emotional prospection. The findings also provide a better 
understanding of mechanisms underlying variability in affective forecasting accuracy and reveal 
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 General Discussion 
This dissertation aimed to determine whether affective working memory—the distinct 
domain of working memory responsible for the maintenance of emotional experiences––plays a 
fundamental role in affective forecasting. We hypothesized that individuals who are better able 
to hold emotions in mind (i.e., superior affective working memory) would be more accurate in 
their predictions of future feelings. In support of this prediction, the results from four studies 
(two pre-registered) demonstrate that individual differences in emotion, but not perceptual, 
maintenance performance predict forecasting accuracy. A specific role of affective working 
memory is further established by including additional measures of visuospatial working memory, 
which do not reliably predict forecasting accuracy (Study 3). Furthermore, this significant 
association holds true even when forecasting feelings about a major real-world event (Study 4). 
Below, we summarize the evidence and discuss the implications, future directions, and 
limitations of the work. 
Summary of Findings 
Across the four studies in this dissertation, we establish a novel and robust relationship 
between affective working memory and affective forecasting accuracy. In Study 1a (N = 66), we 
found that emotion maintenance predicts individual variability in affective forecasting. This 
association was further replicated across Studies 2 (N = 96) and 3 (N = 85). In Study 4 (N = 76), 
we find that this relationship between affective working memory and affective forecasting 
continues to hold, even when using a real-world measure of forecasting (i.e., 2020 U.S. 
Presidential Election) tested on-line across a broad sample of internet-based participants. Taken 
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together, we present strong evidence, based on a total of 323 participants, that the ability to 
maintain emotional experiences supports accurate affective forecasting. 
In comparison, there was no evidence to indicate that perceptual working memory can 
account for variability in forecasting abilities. Across all studies, we find that brightness-
maintenance performance is unrelated to forecasting accuracy. This was also the case for two 
additional, more widely used measures of visuospatial working memory, which did not 
independently predict forecasting accuracy (Study 3). An additional analysis7 suggested after 
publication further supports that non-affective working memory, operationalized as a composite 
of visuospatial working memory measures, does not predict forecasting accuracy. In addition, 
brightness maintenance did not predict accuracy of forecasted feelings about the U.S. election 
(Study 4). The lack of a relationship between cognitive working memory and forecasting 
accuracy underscores that the ability to actively maintain the intensity of an emotional 
experience may be a core component of the ability to predict future feelings. 
Therefore, a consistent relationship emerges between forecasting accuracy and emotion, 
but not brightness, maintenance abilities. Although the standardized regression coefficients (i.e., 
beta weights; Frost, 2019) do not significantly differ between brightness-maintenance and 
emotion-maintenance predictors (see Appendix 4A for beta weight comparison), the identical 
pattern is evident across all studies such that emotion-maintenance accuracy significantly 
predicts forecasting accuracy, whereas brightness-maintenance does not (i.e., the slope does not 
 
 
7 Using a composite-based Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) approach, a visuospatial working memory 
composite score (comprised of Corsi block-tapping forward, Corsi block-tapping backward and change detection Z-
scores) did not significantly predict forecasting accuracy, 𝛽 = –0.043, p = 0.782. This was also the case when using 
a non-affective working memory composite score, which included the measures mentioned above, as well as 
brightness-maintenance performance, 𝛽 = –0.066, p = 0.695. 
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differ from zero). The selective nature of this relationship with affective forecasting further 
establishes the separability of affective and non-affective working memory abilities. 
A potential alternative explanation of these divergent associations with forecasting 
accuracy is that they stem from differences in the psychometric properties (i.e., reliability) of the 
emotion and brightness intensity rating tasks. If emotion and brightness intensity ratings differ in 
their intra-individual consistency over time, then the two maintenance tasks, which use these 
ratings to determine accuracy, might be differentially sensitive to individual differences in 
performance. As a result, relationships with other constructs, such as affective forecasting, may 
also differ. However, in an independent assessment of rating reliability (see Appendix 4B for 
reliability analyses), we found no differences in reliability estimates between emotion and 
brightness intensity ratings. This outcome aligns with our interpretation that the selective 
association we’ve observed reflects the unique role that affective working memory plays in 
emotional prospection. 
Another possibility is that participants are performing the emotion maintenance task 
differently than instructed. That is, instead of maintaining the feelings evoked by the 
photographs, participants could be verbally recoding the emotional intensity of each image as a 
numeric code to remember. If this were the case, then performance on the emotion maintenance 
task would reflect more verbal, rather than affective, working memory abilities. However, 
Mikels and colleagues (2008) addressed this potential explanation by having participants engage 
in articulatory suppression while doing the emotion maintenance task at the same time. If 
participants are using a verbal strategy to complete the emotion maintenance task, concurrent 
articulatory suppression should interfere with verbal recoding and impair accuracy. Yet, Mikels 
et al. (2008) found that simultaneous performance of these tasks actually improved, not 
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worsened, emotion-maintenance accuracy. Additionally, in Studies 1–3 of the present 
dissertation, participants were required to pass an “instruction comprehension” check before 
beginning each maintenance task and again, once the experiment had ended. Thus, although one 
can never be certain, it appears improbable that participants ignore the stated instructions of the 
emotion maintenance task in favor of alternative strategies.  
Additionally, across the first three studies, we examined relationships between 
forecasting accuracy and a number of exploratory measures including visual imagery, emotional 
intelligence, and emotion regulation. We did not find a relationship between forecasting accuracy 
and visual imagery (Studies 1, 2, 3), nor between forecasting accuracy and trait or ability 
emotional intelligence (Studies 1 & 2). However, we did find initial evidence that better 
forecasting accuracy may be related to more frequent cognitive reappraisal—an emotion 
regulation strategy that involves the mental reinterpretation of emotional stimuli (Study 3; Gross, 
Richards, & John, 2006). Thus, further examination of these relationships with affective 
forecasting, especially cognitive reappraisal, will lead to a broader, and more thorough, 
understanding of how individuals accurately predict their feelings. 
Implications & Future Directions 
While affective working memory has previously been studied in variety of contexts, the 
present studies, to our knowledge, are among the first to examine how individual differences in 
working memory for emotion contribute to another mental ability. Evidence from this 
dissertation reveals a direct association between affective working memory and an important 
form of prospective thought. These findings support the idea that affective working memory is a 
fundamental psychological process and may support other forms of higher-order emotional 
abilities. According to this formulation, just as cognitive working memory provides the mental 
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workspace for complex cognitive tasks, affective working memory provides the mental 
workspace for mental simulations where feelings play a prominent role. However, affective 
forecasting is unlikely to be the only process using such a workspace. Thus, future research 
should aim to identify other emotion-related abilities supported by affective working memory. It 
may be case that affective working memory plays a similar role in other types of emotional 
prospection (e.g., counterfactual thinking), or emotion-based choice more generally. 
This work also has important implications for affective forecasting. While inaccurate 
prospection (i.e., future thinking), including affective predictions, is associated with suboptimal 
decision making and negative mental health and well-being outcomes (Charpentier et al., 2016; 
Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; MacLeod, 2016; Roepke & Seligman, 2016), previous studies have 
found that prospection can be improved through the use of interventions (Buehler & McFarland, 
2001; Roepke & Seligman, 2016). The evidence that affective working memory supports 
accurate forecasting indicates that an intervention specifically targeting emotion-maintenance 
abilities may be particularly effective in enhancing forecasting accuracy and related processes. 
This may be best achieved through the use of training, which has been found to improve working 
memory performance in the cognitive domain (e.g., Soveri et al., 2017; see also Redick, 2019), 
and may also be successful in the affective domain (e.g., de Voogd et al., 2016). However, given 
the current debate on whether working memory training benefits are successfully transferred to 
other, related abilities (Redick, 2019), further research is needed to establish whether augmenting 
affective working memory abilities will lead to improved forecasting accuracy. Nevertheless, if 
found to be successful, these programs may be especially beneficial for certain clinical 
populations—such as individuals with Schizophrenia or depression—who have documented 
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impairments in emotional future-thinking abilities (Gard et al., 2007; Hoerger et al., 2012; 
Wenze, Gunthert & German, 2012). 
Limitations  
One methodological limitation of this work is that the design of our core maintenance 
tasks is not optimized to determine the capacity of affective working memory per se—that is, the 
maximum number of emotional experiences participants can hold in mind at the same time. In 
the current emotion maintenance task, participants hold feelings elicited from one image in mind 
over a delay, before comparing the intensity of their feelings to emotions elicited by a second 
image. Thus, for each trial, participants are primarily responsible for maintaining one emotional 
experience. This is also true of the brightness maintenance task, which requires the maintenance 
of one subjective experience of brightness. However, there is robust evidence that people are 
limited in how many items they can hold in mind at one time, at least for non-affective 
information (Cowan, 2010). Although not yet tested, a similar boundary is likely to exist for the 
working memory for emotion such that the number of emotional experiences people are able to 
hold in mind is also constrained. Supporting evidence comes from the finding that concurrent 
performance of an emotion maintenance and emotion regulation task, which requires the focus of 
another, separate emotional experience, impairs affective working memory abilities (Mikels et 
al., 2008). We also know that estimates of cognitive working memory capacity vary across 
individuals with some people able to retain more information than others. We believe that similar 
variability would be found in affective working memory capacity, with some individuals able to 
maintain more emotional experiences than others. Alternatively, the limits of affective working 
memory may also be related to the precision or duration of maintaining emotional experiences.  
Therefore, while further investigation into the boundaries of affective working memory was 
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outside of the scope of the current dissertation, we recognize that doing so in the future would 
allow for a more comprehensive understanding of affective working memory as a construct, and 
provide additional insight into the role it plays in affective forecasting and other types of higher-
order emotional thought. 
Furthermore, a caveat to the finding that cognitive working memory fails to predict 
individual differences in forecasting accuracy is that we did not assess verbal working memory 
abilities. Across all four studies presented here, non-affective working memory was measured 
using the brightness maintenance task, a non-emotional companion measure designed to match 
the demands of the emotion maintenance task (i.e., maintaining the intensity of a subjective 
experience elicited by images taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
Lang, Bradley and Cuthbert, 1997). Additionally, in Study 3, we included two widely used 
measures of visuospatial working memory, Corsi Block Tapping (Corsi, 1972) and a visual 
change detection task (Luck & Vogel, 1997), selected because their perceptual focus made them 
suitable for comparison to the brightness maintenance task. Hence, because we did not include a 
measure of verbal working memory, we cannot discount the possibility that working memory for 
verbal information would contribute to forecasting accuracy. However, Kane et al. (2004) finds 
that across several tasks, verbal and visuospatial working memory abilities are related to one 
another. Additionally, one study that used operation and reading span tasks (see Conway et al., 
2005 for a review on working memory measures) to assess verbal working memory abilities, 
found that working memory capacity was only marginally (p = .06) related to an overestimation 
forecasting bias, and only for a negative, but not positive, outcome (Hoerger et al., 2010). 
Moreover, this association was assessed in an intervention study where half of the participants 
had undergone a program designed to reduce forecasting bias, thereby making these findings 
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unlikely to generalize to other contexts. As a result, we believe the failure of cognitive working 
memory to account for variability in forecasting accuracy would be evident even when tested 
using other measures of working memory, including verbal tasks. Nonetheless, this is an 
empirical question that awaits future research. 
Closing Remarks 
Evidence from four studies presented in this dissertation identifies affective working 
memory as a core ability underlying the accuracy of emotional prospection. We find that the 
predictive association with affective forecasting is selective to the working memory for emotion, 
and that this association extends to forecasted feelings about a major real-world event. These 
findings provide further support for the unique role of affective working memory as a 
fundamental psychological process supporting higher-order emotional thought. Moreover, these 
results suggest that affective working memory may be a promising target for interventions 
designed to improve our capacity to maintain emotional experiences, which can in turn, improve 
people’s ability to anticipate their future emotions and make better decisions.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 2A: Affective Forecasting Stimuli 





1750 This scene shows two bunny rabbits sharing a stalk of grass together 
6230 This scene shows a gun pointed straight at you. It appears to be inches 
away from your face. 
6315 This scene shows a teenage girl reeling in pain having just been hit by a 
man whose hand is clenching her throat. 
1304 This scene shows a wild wolf-like animal directly in front of you. It has 
its jaws wide open and is apparently ready to attack. 
8467 This scene shows world-class runners sprinting for the finish line in 
what looks like a very important race 
4660 This scene shows two young lovers who are kissing each other 
passionately. They are attractive and, from what you can see, naked. 
3170 This scene shows a baby with a facial tumor. The tumor, which is 
protruding through an eye socket, is also causing one side of the infant's 
head to bulge out. 
7580 This scene shows a desert with gently rolling sand dunes, a setting sun, 
and a deep blue sky. The desert is very still. 
8496 This scene shows children barreling down a water slide. They are 
yelling for joy and having a great time 
9301 This scene shows a filthy toilet that hasn’t been cleaned in a very long 




Appendix 2B: Analyses of Directionality in Affective Forecasting Errors  
Collapsing across participants included in analyses from Studies 1a, 1b, 2, and 3 (N = 
315), the average difference between predicted and experienced feelings was M = –0.11 (SD = 
1.05; raw score range: –10 to +10), indicating no overall bias for participants to overestimate or 
underestimate how intensely they would feel, t(314) = –1.92, p = .056, d = .11. However, we 
found a significant difference in deviation scores between positive (M = –1.11, SD = 1.74) and 
negative (M = .89, SD = 1.52) forecasts such that there was a tendency for participants to 
overestimate how negatively they would feel for negative trials but underestimate how positively 
they would feel on positive trials, t(314) = 14.16, p < .001, d = 1.22. As can be seen in Table 2B-
1, this pattern is evidenced in each individual study as well. 
 




N = 66 
Study 1b 
N = 68 
Study 2 
N = 96 
Study 3 
N = 85 
Negative 0.98 (1.53) 1.06 (1.74) 0.77 (1.38) 0.81 (1.5) 
Positive –0.87 (1.84) –1.45 (2.03) –1.0 (1.67) –1.17 (1.46) 





Appendix 2C: Pair Selection using Item Response Theory 
Based on the data obtained from Studies 1a and 1b, item response theory (IRT) was used 
to select the subsets of stimuli for each maintenance task to be included in Studies 2 and 3. We 
used a series of 2-parameter logistic models, which allows for estimation of the threshold, or the 
difficulty of the item, and the slope, or how related the item is to the construct being measured by 
the task (Harris, 1989). The slope estimate is also referred to as “item discrimination”, which is 
the criteria we used to determine which pairs were most related to the construct being measured. 
Eligible pairs (see below) were entered into the models and those with the highest discrimination 
estimates were selected for inclusion in the refined stimulus sets. The general formula for the 2-
parameter logistical model we used in the present analyses is  
P(yij=1|, , ) = logis(j(i – j )) 
where the probability of getting an item correct, P, is a function of the difficulty of the item (j), 
the ability (i) of the individual, i, and the discrimination of the item, j.  
 
Affect Maintenance. Trials from all participants in Study 1a were coded as correct or incorrect to 
be included in one of two IRT models, performed separately for positive and negative pairs. 
 
Brightness Maintenance. After exclusion of images due to content as described in the main text, 
remaining trials were coded as correct or incorrect for inclusion in the model. This analysis was 
based on the subset of participants in Study 1b who performed the task in the same image order 
as was to be used in subsequent studies. 
Study 2 
For the affect maintenance task, the 28 pairs with the highest discrimination estimates for 
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each valence from Study 1a were selected for inclusion for Study 2, making up 56 pairs total. For 
the brightness maintenance task, the 28 pairs with the highest discrimination scores from Study 
1b were selected for inclusion in Study 2. 
Study 3 
Noting that the overall accuracy of the two maintenance tasks differed significantly in 
Study 2, we reconsidered our approach for selecting the most diagnostic pairs to achieve more 
matched performance. Accordingly, for Study 3, the most discriminating pairs were selected for 
each task, with the constraint that the discrimination estimates would be matched between the 28 
brightness maintenance (M = .69, SD = .40), and 56 affect maintenance (M = .67, SD = 0.34) 
pairs, t(82) = .19, p = .847. To further verify the approximate equivalence of these estimates, a 
Bayesian independent samples t-test using JASP (Version 0.9) was also calculated with Cauchy 
priors (scale = .707) to determine the Bayes Factor (BF01) score, which compares the likelihood 
of the null and alternative hypotheses given the data. A BF01 of 4.11 revealed substantial support 
for no difference in discrimination estimates between image sets, indicating the data were more 
than four times more likely to be explained by the null hypothesis. Additionally, within the affect 
maintenance stimuli, the discrimination estimates were matched between the 28 positive (M = 
0.66, SD = 0.35) and 28 negative (M = 0.68, SD = 0.34) pairs, t(54) = .23, p  = .82. A Bayesian 
independent samples t-test revealed a BF01 of 3.65, indicating strong support for the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference between discrimination estimates between positive and 
negative image sets. 
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Appendix 3A: Life Events Forecasting Measure 
This study also included a novel, exploratory measure of event-based affective 
forecasting that compared predicted and experienced feelings to everyday life events. The 
majority of existing event-based forecasting measures use major national public (e.g., election) 
or personal (e.g., exam performance, Valentine’s day) events that rely on a predictable but 
constrained timeline. Our aim was to create a forecasting measure that incorporated a range of 
potential personal, real-life experiences, as opposed to a single target event, in an effort to 
eliminate some of the scheduling constraints inherent in other measures, and to develop a 
measure intended to be more representative of the kind of forecasting individuals engage in on a 
daily basis. We adapted an event prediction measure used originally by Marroquín and Nolen-
Hoeksema (2015) to examine event likelihood and predicted feelings about potential events. 
Unlike Marroquín and Nolen-Hoeksema however, we include a follow-up assessment where we 
also collect ratings of experienced feelings after the events have occurred. Obtaining both 
predicted and experienced feelings allows for the calculation of the discrepancy, and therefore, 
the accuracy, of individuals’ forecasts. 
To create this measure, we ran a pilot study to select items from a pool of 96 life 
events—84 taken from Strunk, Lopez & DuRubeis (2006), Miranda & Mennin (2007), and 
Marroquín & Nolen-Hoeksema (2015), and 12 original items we created to be relevant to current 
events (e.g., the Covid-19 pandemic). Participants in this pilot study (N = 77) rated the likelihood 
and predicted feelings to each of the 96 potential events. After a 3-week delay, participants 
reported which events occurred and rated their experienced feelings for each item. To maximize 
the likelihood that future participants would experience the events we included in the new 
measure, we selected 28 (14 positive, 14 negative) of the most commonly experienced life events 
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(i.e., items with the highest reported frequency among pilot participants), while also maintaining 
an equal number of positive and negative items, matched in likelihood and predicted feeling 
intensity. Ratings of experienced feelings were used to determine forecasting accuracy exclusion 
criteria (i.e., outliers) for the primary study, but were not used for item selection. 
Method 
We created a novel measure of affective forecasting by modifying an event prediction 
task (Marroquín & Nolan-Hoeksema, 2015) to compare predicted and experienced feelings to 
life events. In Phase I (Session 1), participants predicted how they would feel about an event 
(e.g., you have a supervisor or teacher praise your work; see Table 3A-1 for full list of items) if it 
were to happen in the near future using a scale (absolute resolution: 21 points) from not at all 
happy to extremely happy. Three weeks later, in Phase II (Session 3), participants reported how 
they felt about each event that happened in the moment it occurred using the same scale. 
Participants also reported when the event had occurred (in approximate weeks) and how they felt 
about each event ‘right now,’ that is, at the time of rating. Participants reported experiencing an 
average of 9.33 (4.52 positive, 4.81 negative; see Table 3A-1 for the reported frequencies of each 
event) of the 28 possible events, that took place approximately 1 week prior to rating (M = 1.01 
weeks, SD = .99). Error scores were calculated as the absolute difference between Phase I and 
Phase II ratings (possible range: 0 – 20; score >10 indicates valence reversal), averaged across all 
items that occurred for that participant. Two outliers were removed (forecasting error > 3 SD 
above the mean), and three additional participants did not report experiencing any of the 28 
events. 
Relationships with Maintenance Task Performance 
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As outlined in our preregistration (https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=et4i2p), we used a 
multivariate linear regression to assess whether accuracy on the life events forecasting measure 
was significantly predicted by emotion-maintenance and brightness-maintenance performance. 
As expected, brightness-maintenance performance did not predict forecasting accuracy, 𝛽 = .163, 
p = .210. Yet, unlike the other measures of forecasting abilities, emotion-maintenance 
performance did not account for individual variability in forecasting on the life events measure, 
𝛽 = –.11, p = .393. The absence of a significant relationship between emotion maintenance and 
forecasting accuracy on the life events measure may be due to several unique features of this 
task. First, in the majority of studies that examine affective forecasting, accuracy scores are 
calculated using the same specific events and approximate timing for all participants. In contrast, 
for this life events measure, forecasting accuracy was calculated based only on the events that 
happened to each participant and the specific details of those events could vary. This led to 
discrepancies between which, and how many, events were used to determine each participant’s 
forecasting abilities, adding additional sources of variance to these scores. Furthermore, in the 
life events measure, accuracy was based on participants’ retrospective ratings of how they felt 
when the event occurred. Consequently, the time between event occurrence and rating varied 
among events for a given individual, and among individuals.  Furthermore, people had to rely on 
long-term memory to report rate their feelings. Because memory for our previous emotions is 
subject to considerable error (see Levine, Safer, & Lench, 2006 for review), using past, instead 
of present, ratings of feelings may have added further variability to this measure, thereby 
potentially obscuring any relationship with emotion-maintenance ability. Thus, future work is 
necessary for determining if and how this measure can be used in future forecasting experiments. 
It may be particularly useful to explore the unique characteristics of the life events (e.g., 
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expectedness, frequency, overall relevance) to determine which items are most sensitive to 
forecasting error, and therefore, are most suitable for creating a composite forecasting score. 
Relationships with Other Forecasting Measures 
We also directly compared forecasting on the life events task to performance on the other 
forecasting measures used in this study. We found that participants were more accurate in their 
forecasted feelings to life events (M = 2.29, SD = 1.15) than for the election outcome (M = 2.81, 
SD = 2.22, t(78) = – 2.05, p =  .044), and marginally more accurate compared to description-
based forecasting (M = 2.59, SD = 1.04, t(80) = 1.88, p = .06). Nevertheless, forecasting error on 
the life events measure was related to error on both the description-based (r(79) = .228, p = .041) 
and election outcome (r(77) = .321, p = .004) measures, although the association between 
description-based and election outcome forecasting error was not significant, r(79) = .13, p = 
.248). These relationships between the life events and other forecasting measures may stem from 
a common component of forecasting other than affective working memory, possibly related to 
other aspects of introspection. Thus, while follow-up work aimed at obtaining a better 
understanding of this task is required, these significant associations indicate there may be some 
promise for this method to measure forecasting accuracy in future studies. 
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Each Event  
You feel misunderstood by people 34 0.405 
You experience a moment of great insight 30 0.357 
Things don't work out as hoped 47 0.560 
You go out of town for leisure 13 0.155 
You successfully teach someone a new skill or concept 25 0.298 
You receive a call from a telemarketer 27 0.321 
You fall badly behind in work 18 0.214 
You feel socially inadequate. 36 0.429 
You go out to dinner and have a relaxing and enjoyable 
conversation with friends. 
22 0.262 
You are unable to cope with your responsibilities 23 0.274 
You learn a new skill related to work or school 18 0.214 
You are admired by people 27 0.321 
You have an inspiring conversation 31 0.369 
You read and complete a book 18 0.214 
You have an unexpected expense 24 0.286 
You have a supervisor or teacher praise your work 29 0.345 
You often have work or school go smoothly 45 0.536 
You have a headache 46 0.548 
You are considered to be an excellent listener 23 0.274 
You have lots of good times with friends 36 0.429 
You feel unable to confide in anyone 25 0.298 
You reach out to a good friend who lives far away 38 0.452 
You have hard work acknowledged at work or in class 27 0.321 
You see an offensive post on social media 37 0.440 
An activity you were planning on attending is postponed due to 
the pandemic 
25 0.298 
You forget your mask and you have to return home to retrieve it 18 0.214 
A non-masked stranger moves too close for comfort 33 0.393 
You hear of another devastating wildfire 9 0.107 
1Proportions were calculated using data from the 84 participants who completed both phases
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Appendix 4A: Comparing Beta Weights of Maintenance Task Predictors 
We assessed whether there was significant difference between how well emotion-
maintenance and brightness-maintenance performance predicted forecasting accuracy by 
comparing their beta weights. Beta weights (β), or standardized regression coefficients, represent 
the effect of change in each predictor (i.e., maintenance task performance) on the outcome 
variable (i.e., forecasting accuracy), holding other predictors constant (Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 
1990; Frost, 2019). To test whether beta weights differed between emotion-maintenance and 
brightness-maintenance predictors, we ran an additional regression model for each study8 that 
included a maintenance type (emotion, brightness) by maintenance accuracy interaction term as 
an additional predictor of forecasting accuracy (Jaccard et al., 1990; Frost, 2019). A significant 
interaction term would indicate that forecasting accuracy was differentially predicted by 
performance on the brightness and emotion maintenance tasks. Across Studies 2, 3, & 4, we did 
not find significant differences between emotion-maintenance and brightness-maintenance 
predictors (see Table 4A-1)9. However, a clear pattern emerged across all studies such that 
emotion maintenance significantly predicted variability in forecasting accuracy, whereas 
brightness maintenance did not. 
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8 This analysis could not be performed for Study 1, where a between-subject design was employed such that 
participants completed either the emotion maintenance or brightness maintenance tasks. 
9 Results do not change when tested using a robust, rather than ordinary least squares, regression. 
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 β p β p β p 
Study 1 –0.20 .102 –0.32 .008* NA NA 
Study 2 –0.16 .103 –0.33 .001* 0.118 .418 




–0.08 .503 –0.29 .023* 0.072 .693 
Study 4:  
Election Outcome 
Forecasting 
0.18 .149 –0.33 .009* 0.300 .097 
*p < .05 





Appendix 4B: Test-Retest Reliability of Emotion and Brightness Intensity Ratings 
Across the four studies in the present dissertation, emotion, but not brightness, 
maintenance task performance predicted affective forecasting accuracy, suggesting that affective 
working memory plays a unique role in forecasting future feelings. An alternative explanation is 
that this selective relationship is due to differences in the reliability of rating emotion versus 
brightness intensity of images used in the present research. Upon completion of each 
maintenance task, participants rate the emotion or brightness intensity of the corresponding 
images as they appear individually and in a random order. These ratings are then used to 
determine individualized accuracy on the maintenance tasks by inferring how participants should 
have responded during each maintenance trial. Therefore, if there are differences between the 
consistency of how individuals rate emotion, compared to brightness, intensity, then using these 
ratings as the basis for calculating maintenance task performance could be problematic. For 
instance, differences in the reliability of the intensity ratings may cause the emotion and 
brightness maintenance tasks to be differentially sensitive to individual differences in 
performance. If this were the case, then relationships identified with maintenance accuracy using 
these ratings may not reflect the true associations between constructs. Therefore, we computed 
and compared the test-retest reliability of the brightness intensity and emotion intensity ratings in 
an independent sample of participants.  
Method 
A total of 35 participants (ages 18 –29, mean (SD) age = 22.68 (3.3), 63% female, 71% 
students) completed the study. This sample size exceeded the goal of 30 participants, set in 
accordance with guidelines from Koo & Li (2016). Each participant completed two blocks of the 
emotion intensity rating task (112 images) and two blocks of the brightness intensity rating task 
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(56 images). During each trial, participants viewed an image and rated either the emotion 
intensity (i.e., strength or amount of emotional reaction) or brightness intensity (i.e., amount of 
perceived overall light or illumination) using a visual analog scale ranging from Not At All 
Intense to Extremely Intense. At the onset of each of the four blocks, participants were instructed 
which rating task (brightness intensity or emotion intensity) to complete and on-screen cues 
during each trial served as additional reminders. To minimize any potential order or sequence 
effects, block order was counterbalanced (i.e., ABBA, ABAB, BAAB, BABA) across 
participants. Participants were recruited via Prolific and completed the study online from their 
personal computers. 
Results 
To assess the test-retest reliability of the brightness intensity and emotion intensity rating 
tasks, we calculated intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC). ICC values reflect the proportion of 
variance accounted for by the random effects, where an estimate of zero reflects no reliability 
and an estimate of one reflects perfect reliability (Koo & Li, 2016). We calculated the ICC 
estimates and 95% confidence intervals based on the absolute agreement of ratings using a 2-way 
mixed model (fixed effect: time of measurement; random effects: participants, images), 
computed separately for brightness intensity and emotion intensity ratings. The ICC estimates for 
the brightness intensity and emotion intensity ratings were 0.444 (95% CI [0.297, 0.594]) and 
.447 (95% CI [0.331, 0.564]), respectively. As can be seen in Figure 4B-1, there is substantial 
overlap between the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates, indicating there is no 
difference between the reliability of emotion and brightness intensity ratings. 
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Figure 4B-1. Reliability estimates for brightness and emotion intensity ratings. 
 
Discussion 
We found no difference in test-retest reliability between ratings of emotion and 
brightness intensity—the ICCs were approximately equivalent. This suggests that differences in 
the consistency of ratings cannot account for the selective relationship between affective working 
memory and forecasting accuracy identified in this dissertation. Of note, the reliability estimates 
for both rating tasks are considered ‘poor,’ according to psychometric standards (Koo & Li, 
2016). This is likely a result of the low between-subjects variability of the intensity ratings, 
which has been shown to reduce reliability (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2017). Because these 
images were selected based on their ability to evoke emotional reaction (Bradley & Lang, 2007; 
Mikels et al. Pilot Studies A & B, 2008) or normative ratings of subjective experiences of 
brightness (Mikels et al. Pilot Study C, 2008), it is not surprising that intensity ratings would be 
similar across participants. And while the lack of variability in these ratings would be a concern 
if they were being directly tested for relationships with other constructs, these ratings are used 



















individual differences in performance. Furthermore, reliability for the maintenance tasks 
themselves has been assessed with evidence of significant test-retest reliability in maintenance 
abilities, with the exception of the most difficult brightness-maintenance trials (Broome, Mikels 
& Gard, 2012). Overall, while reliability of the intensity ratings may be limited, estimates are 
consistent between the emotion and brightness domains, and thus cannot explain differences 
between the associations with forecasting accuracy. 
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